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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE INTELLECTUALS
(Reference Title: Polo IV-58)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY

The Chinese Communist Party and the Intellectuals

This study is a working paper, reflecting information received through 1 May 1958. Examining only one policy among the many inter-related policies of the Chinese Communist party, this paper attempts primarily to illuminate certain hypotheses which are central to the work of the Polo project. These hypotheses are: that there can be a significant range of disagreement among party leaders on major issues; that disagreement can persist even after Mao Tse-tung has decided what policy to pursue; that the views of individual leaders can sometimes be conjectured from their roles in the party's presentation of its policy; and that the positions taken by leaders on a matter of policy can affect their status in the party. That these hypotheses are valid has been strongly suggested--and in some instances demonstrated--by developments in other areas of policy which have been examined by Polo but have not yet been formalized in a Polo paper. It is believed that the development of the party's policy toward intellectuals gives further support to the first three of the above hypotheses, although information has not yet come to hand which would demonstrate that this particular issue has appreciably affected the status of individual leaders.

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SECRET**THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE INTELLECTUALS
(SUMMARY)****Party Policy Toward Intellectuals, 1921-1949Page 1**

Like the Soviet Communist party, the Chinese Communist party distrusted intellectuals from the start. The CCP followed Stalin in attempting to reconstruct old intellectuals and produce a new set of Communist intellectuals. Mao Tse-tung himself made clear that the price for even the qualified trust of the party was the destruction of the intellectual as a free intelligence.

Early Years of the Peiping Regime, 1949-1954Page 3

The Peiping regime soon undertook the thought-remolding of intellectuals. Beginning in 1950, intellectuals lived in the same fear as did the "capitalists." Writers and artists were attacked in 1951 and early 1952. In spring 1952, however, Peiping shifted to a "soft" line on the capitalists. There appeared to be concurrently a somewhat softer policy toward intellectuals. There was not another major campaign against the intellectuals until 1954.

New Attacks on the Intellectuals, 1954Page 7

Mao's two top lieutenants, Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai, differed somewhat in discussing intellectuals in September 1954. Liu, closely following Mao's line, emphasized the need for long and difficult remolding, whereas Chou said that remolding had been generally successful and intellectuals were already playing a major role. Thereafter, the party launched two new campaigns, against classical scholars and philosophers. Protégés of Mao appeared to be directing these campaigns. Attacks on a philosopher critical of the CCP's rural policies coincided with Mao's decision to speed up agricultural collectivization.

The Hu Feng Case, 1954-1955Page 11

Attacks on intellectuals within the Chinese Communist party soon focused on the independent-minded writer Hu Feng. He had long believed that Mao's policy on the arts should be interpreted more liberally. Hu was finally branded a "counterrevolutionary" and imprisoned, thus vindicating the illiberal exponents of Mao's policy. While some members of the CCP central committee may privately have sympathized with Hu's view, apparently none was active

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on Hu's behalf. The case was followed by warnings against pollution of the CCP by unreliable intellectuals. By late 1955, party leaders had badly frightened the intellectuals and had reduced their ability and inclination to do useful work.

Chou En-lai's "Soft" Line, January 1956Page 16

Chou En-lai in January 1956, citing the regime's urgent need to advance in the modern sciences, called for much better treatment of those intellectuals willing to work within the limits of Communist dogma. He asserted that about 80 percent of the intellectuals were politically reliable, proposed a number of practical measures to improve their lot, and asked that a large proportion of them be taken into the party by 1962. Of the CCP's top leaders, Mao Tse-tung and Chou were presumably in agreement on this new tack; Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, however, were probably reluctant to see even this much "liberalization." The party propaganda department promptly supported Chou's new line.

Mao Inaugurates "Liberalization," Spring 1956Page 21

The Mao-Chou line was reflected in Peiping's handling of de-Stalinization in April. The Chinese statement asserted that a perfect harmony of views would never exist in any society. Then in May, in an unpublished speech, Mao took another big step in offering the slogan, "let all flowers bloom, let various schools of thought contend." Mao's propaganda chief, Lu Ting-i, soon provided an authorized explication of Mao's position. Citing, like Chou, the need for scientific advance, Lu denied that the natural sciences have a class character. Lu called in various ways for a relaxation of party control over both the theories and the thinkers in the natural sciences.

Uncertainty about "Liberalization," June 1956 - February 1957Page 27

Lu's speech was first interpreted by regime spokesmen in a conservative way. The propaganda department then decided on a "soft" interpretation. At the party congress in September, CCP leaders again differed in their discussion of intellectuals. Liu Shao-chi endorsed the "hundred flowers" policy, but emphasized the need for long-term remolding of intellectuals, warned of their

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corrupting influence, and left no room for criticism of Communist doctrine. Teng Hsiao-ping did not even mention the "hundred flowers," and emphasized the need for careful selection and supervision of party members. Chou En-lai was more conciliatory than either. A conservative interpretation of the "hundred flowers" became dominant after the troubles in Eastern Europe, and continued into February.

Mao Reaffirms a Liberal "Hundred Flowers," Early**1957 Page 32**

Mao Tse-tung in February and March reaffirmed his "hundred flowers" policy in unprecedentedly liberal terms. In discussing "contradictions among the people," Mao argued that there are conflicts of interests between the leaders and the led in a Socialist society, and that, in dealing with the problems arising from such conflicts, the party would require constant criticism from outside the party.

[redacted] the "hundred flowers" policy had been opposed by most other CCP leaders, but that he had insisted on it because he was sure he was right. Neither of Mao's speeches included the criteria for acceptable criticism--which in fact cut off free discussion--that appeared in the later published version of the February speech. Early in March, the propaganda department shifted its emphasis to get in step with Mao's liberal line. Other party leaders, however, remained silent through March.

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Confusion and Opposition in the Party, April 1957 . . . Page 35

Throughout April, there were continuing indications of confusion about Mao's line [redacted]

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[redacted] and of party opposition to the "hundred flowers" policy, which was in conflict with long-established patterns of thought. To the orthodox, Mao's policy must have seemed a dangerous novelty. The party press tried to represent the party as united in support of the "hundred flowers." Peng Chen did strongly endorse Mao's line.

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[redacted] In late April, the central committee made the "hundred flowers" policy an important part of its party "rectification" campaign. At the end of April, Mao spoke again for his policy [redacted]

[redacted] apparently condemned his opponents in strong language, and seems even to have suggested an inclination to modify the party's organizational methods.

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SECRETThe Intellectuals Attack the Party, May 1957Page 38

Many intellectuals, while correctly believing that Mao's "hundred flowers" policy had not been designed as a trap, failed to realize that Mao had not anticipated fundamental criticism of the party. Many intellectuals therefore spoke out boldly in forums held during May. They struck hard at the CCP's monopoly of power, its methods of asserting its monopoly, and its basic policies--including the speed of socialization, the scope of the regime's security and indoctrination programs, and its fidelity to the USSR. There was some slight effort during May to keep criticism within bounds, but not until late May was there a signal from a top-level leader that the party was about to crack down.

Mao Reverses "Liberalization," June 1957Page 41

An indication that "liberalization" would be reversed was provided by Mao himself on 25 May, by which time CCP leaders were probably united in that decision. The public reversal came on 18 June, with the appearance of an official version of Mao's February speech on "contradictions." While Mao reaffirmed that contradictions among "the people" were to be handled by generally conciliatory means, Mao made clear that serious opponents were excluded from the ranks of the people and that the party intended to convert all who questioned any part of Communist dogma. In discussing intellectuals, Mao reflected Liu Shao-chi's abiding suspicion of that class rather than his own recent confidence. While asserting that the "hundred flowers" policy would continue, Mao stated criteria for distinguishing flowers from weeds which forbade criticism of the party's monopoly of power and of its basic program--just those things which had been most enthusiastically criticized in May. The CCP propaganda department tried to conceal Mao's original miscalculation by encouraging the view that a trap had been laid for the intellectuals. By the end of June, the conclusion was clear to the party and the populace: "liberalization" was finished.

Solidarity of CCP Leaders, Summer 1957Page 45

Chinese Communist leaders were at pains throughout summer 1957 to demonstrate their solidarity on the decision to reverse "liberalization" and to take a harder line toward the intellectuals. Those of Mao's lieutenants

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who had had the most important roles in promoting "liberalization"--Chou En-lai, Lu Ting-i, and Peng Chen--made major speeches lining themselves up with Mao's revised position. Several other politburo members had lesser roles in explicating the new line, as did central committee members directing the important central departments of the party. Liu Shao-chi, who was publicly and plausibly charged by one rightist in this period with having opposed "liberalization" from the start, remained silent. This he could well afford to do, if he were known by other party leaders to have been right. Teng Hsiao-ping, believed to have stood with Liu against "liberalization," also remained silent in this period, biding his time until September.

Teng Hsiao-ping Sums It Up, September 1957Page 48

In September 1957, Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping reported on the party's decision to merge its "rectification" movement and the "antirightist campaign" into one nationwide "rectification" movement. Addressing the intellectuals, Teng stated flatly that there would be no change in any of the CCP's principles and major policies. In contrast to the view held by Mao and Chou En-lai in 1956 and early 1957, Teng said that most intellectuals were still hostile to the party, and called for intensive "socialist education" and vigorous organizational measures to ensure party control of them. Teng further observed that the party would raise its standards for recruitment of intellectuals, and that most of those already in the party would have a harder time. By the time Teng's speech was published, hundreds of "rightists" had been "exposed" and ruined, many had been arrested, and some had reportedly been shot. It must have been clear to the intellectuals that their position in October 1957 was, and would remain, considerably worse than it had been in early 1956 when the experiment with "liberalization" began.

Effects on Party LeadersPage 52

The failure of Mao's experiment with "liberalization" in 1956-57 followed at least two other instances of Mao's personal intervention in 1955-56 which had disappointing results. By mid-1957, Mao had probably brought nearer the time

when he would be encouraged to step aside. Chou

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En-lai, as a spokesman for "liberalization," presumably did not decline in stature in Mao's eyes, but probably lost some face with "organizational" leaders who had avoided association with the policy. Lu Ting-i was so well known as simply a reflector of Mao's position that his status could have remained unchanged, but he may have lost a little. Peng Chen similarly may have slipped only a little, but, if his strong support of Mao's line in spring 1957 represented a deliberate bid for Mao's favor over Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng injured himself seriously with the latter pair. Among the conjectured defenders of orthodoxy, Liu and Teng seemed to come out very well. They apparently retained the high favor of Mao and gained in stature with other party leaders, enhancing their prospects, together or separately, to dominate the post-Mao party leadership. Ko Ching-shih apparently improved his chances to be taken into the party's inner circle, and Kang Sheng may have improved his previously declining position.

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SECRET**Party Policy Toward Intellectuals, 1921-1949**

Under the influence of Comintern agents in the 1920's, the Chinese Communist party (CCP) reflected Lenin's and Stalin's distrust of intellectuals. As early as June 1922, the CCP central committee's First Manifesto stated that "The government /That is, the Chinese Nationalist party (Kuomintang)/ opposition game, played by the bourgeoisie, the Intelligentsia, and the politicians, cannot be trusted."

The CCP also criticized intellectuals within its own ranks. Stalin had conceived the device of blaming the executors--not the originators--of a policy for its failure, and had held that the class status of the executors was partly responsible for their incompetence. When his China policy resulted in a sequence of severe defeats for the CCP and he was obliged to change the line, Stalin baited the "intellectuals" in the Chinese party. Following suit, CCP leaders in 1927--under the guidance of Comintern agent Lominadze--attacked other unspecified CCP leaders as intellectuals. These latter were criticized for "vacillation, irresolution at critical moments, and false, unrevolutionary theories which were contradictory to Communism." Similarly, the Political Resolution of the CCP's sixth congress, which was held in Moscow in September 1928, characterized some members of the Chinese party's "revolutionary intelligentsia" as "class-alienated elements" whose line of thought led the Chinese party into the practice of putschism.

In the late 1920's, Stalin also attacked the Russian intelligentsia in order to maintain his prestige in the USSR. He made intellectuals the scapegoats for discontent created by his policy of rapid socialization between 1928 and 1931. They were charged with economic sabotage and conspiracy with foreigners against the Soviet regime.

The pressing need for a technical intelligentsia, however, resulted in a new line in June 1931, when Stalin announced a change from the policy of "routing" intellectuals to a policy of "enlisting them and solicitude for them." In addition to utilizing the remnants of the old intelligentsia, Stalin set in motion a vast training program to produce a new Soviet-bred technical intelligentsia. In June 1931 he called on the party to "create its own industrial and technical intelligentsia," and in November 1936 he remarked that the Soviet intelligentsia

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was "entirely new, bound by its very roots with the working class and peasantry." In order to maintain doctrinal consistency, Stalin described it as a class "stratum," rather than a class, and designated it the "working intelligentsia."

The change in Stalin's attitude--from total distrust of intellectuals to qualified trust of reconstructed or Soviet-produced intellectuals--was reflected in the CCP's policy. For the Chinese party, the intellectuals were desired as political rather than economic allies.

Chinese intellectuals enjoyed considerable political prestige in China, where the masses of people were (and are) illiterate. In 1939 Mao described them as having a "keen political sense" and as "generally quite revolutionary." He placed most of China's intellectuals in the petty bourgeois class--a class which he described as "a reliable ally of the proletariat." For reasons that are not clear, Mao declared that the intellectuals do not constitute either a separate class or a "stratum."

Although Mao's doctrinal definition of the intelligentsia differed from Stalin's, he raised a requirement for cooperation with intellectuals which was similar to Stalin's. He specified that only a reconstructed, Communist-bred intelligentsia could work together with the party. In a 1939 article, he stated that:

The ultimate line of demarcation between the revolutionary intellectuals and nonrevolutionary and counterrevolutionary intellectuals lies in whether they are willing to, and actually do, become one with the workers and peasants. The ultimate line of demarcation between them lies in this alone, and not in whether they talk about the Three People's Principles or Marxism.

For the intellectuals "actually" to unite with the workers and peasants (that is, to become loyal to the CCP) implied that a new mental attitude might be created among them by the party. Mao seems to have had a belief similar to Stalin's that ideological indoctrination could "create" for the Communists their "own" intelligentsia.

The December 1939 Decision on the Absorption of Intellectuals of the CCP's central committee removed the barrier to the induction of intellectuals into the party. It

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criticized party units for their reluctance to enroll intellectuals and called for a policy of "absorbing intellectuals en masse."

In his 1942 Speech at the Yenan Forum of Literature and Art, Mao made it clear that the price of gaining even the qualified trust of the CCP for any intellectual was his self-destruction as a free intelligence.

Will not Marxism-Leninism then destroy the creative spirit? Yes. It will destroy any brand of creative spirit which is not of the masses and of the proletariat. And is it not right that these brands of creative spirit should be destroyed as far as proletarian writers and artists are concerned? I think so....The intellectuals must identify themselves with the masses and serve the masses. This process may, in fact it definitely will, produce much suffering and friction.

Mao thought that Chinese intellectuals--although mostly of the "scribbling set," writers, philosophers, and philologists--might become a cohesive political force. That is, they might develop group attitudes and group interests sufficiently strong to make large numbers of them behave in the way that is usually associated with the concept of social classes. He would not tolerate attitudes and interests basically different from those of the CCP.

The policy embodied in Mao's 1942 speech reflected Stalin's view that the potential of the intelligentsia to oppose the party dictatorship must be eliminated. Indeed, Mao emphasized more strongly than Stalin the need to remold the thoughts of intellectuals, especially the thoughts of the older men. Mao's emphasis apparently became a CCP policy. There is some evidence that an individual whose mind was being remolded by the Chinese Communists was treated by his reformers more destructively and over a longer period of time than one subjected to Soviet Communist indoctrination. Even as early as 1942, however, Mao was careful to speak of this policy in terms of a need to "persuade and educate" deviators.

Early Years of the Peiping Regime, 1949-1954

A number of Mao Tse-tung's protégés were charged with stating Mao's policy toward intellectuals after the Peiping regime was established in 1949. The key figures in the

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party's propaganda department were Lu Ting-i, the department director, and Chen Po-ta and Hu Chiao-mu, Lu's effective deputies. Lu had become important in the party after Mao took over the party leadership in 1935. Both Chen and Hu had been secretaries to Mao. All three had been Mao's spokesmen for many years. The three were probably the writers of most of the leading editorials in the party's newspaper, the People's Daily. A fourth important spokesman in this field was the Yenan-trained Chou Yang, who was apparently to specialize in party policy toward the arts.

The CCP's effort to extend its control over China's old intellectuals and to train new intellectuals was intensified within months after the establishment of the Peiping regime in October 1949. In a June 1950 speech, Mao Tse-tung personally sparked a drive for the thought-remolding of intellectuals--an effort which had been under way but had not assumed campaign proportions.

In imposing the method of "criticism and self-criticism," Mao was following a Stalinist precedent for attaining complete submissiveness of intellectuals. Self-criticism in China was actually a public confession of a number of practical and "thought" crimes which a Communist cadre had "exposed" in his criticism of an intellectual. This public confession presumably helped the intellectual to align himself with the CCP's program. It was intended to impress on the populace that the party was both wiser and more powerful than the intelligentsia.

Beginning in 1950, the intellectuals apparently lived in the same atmosphere of fear that oppressed the "capitalists." Many later spoke of the "wounds" they had received in thought-remolding drives.

Writers and artists were the first group attacked by the party. In April 1951, the CCP concentrated its efforts on a film, the Story of Wu Hsun, which depicted the life of a 19th-century individualist who raised money for a school by begging and shrewd investments.

In attacking the film, the Peiping regime reversed a public stand on intellectual policy taken by one of its top puppets. The film had been praised by Kuo Mo-jo, the professional "non-Communist" whom the CCP had chosen to head the All-China Federation of Literature and Art. Kuo later felt obliged to state that he, like other non-Communist intellectuals, was still "remolding" his thoughts.

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This admission was apparently meant to show any intellectuals who might resist "remolding" that even an intellectual with impressive party support was required to endure it.

Playing a major role in the drive to impose tighter party control over writers and artists was Chou Yang. Chou clearly regarded himself as acting for Mao. When, in May 1952, he called for the strengthening of "organization" of creative work, Mao's 1942 Speech was his text. In a People's Daily article, Chou stressed Mao's view that the arts must serve the revolution, must be based on the "science" of dialectical materialism, and must prevent the encroachment of bourgeois standards.

In the same May article, Chou expressed Mao's realistic view that it would require considerable time to effect thought-remolding among literary and art workers. Mao's determination to reduce these intellectuals to loyal followers of the party line, regardless of obstacles, was reaffirmed in Chou's article:

Thought remolding--that is, the defeat of all backward ideologies by means of the progressive ideology of the working class, involving changes in a man's entire world-view, sentiments, psychological make-up, habits, and interests--is a long and painful process.

As pointed out by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, "The complete solution of this problem necessitates a long period of 8 to 10 years."

However, Comrade Mao Tse-tung also pointed out with the greatest determination that, "No matter how long it takes us, we must have the problem solved--irrevocably and once and for all."

In the spring of 1952, Peiping released Mao's essay On Contradiction. The release apparently was the signal for a shift to a "soft" line on "capitalists." The essay took the line that the principal "contradiction"--the class struggle between capitalist and worker--may in some circumstances be regarded as nonprincipal, so that it may be minimized. The party apparently was being informed that cadres must not insist too much on the fundamental doctrine of class struggle because there were more urgent, practical issues to consider.

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Stalin's policy of "smashing" the capitalists--a policy which was being carried out in Eastern Europe at the time--was in effect being criticized between the lines of On Contradiction. The scapegoats were theorists who had assiduously followed the party's previous "hard" line in writing for Study, the CCP's theoretical journal. Prominent theorist Ai Ssu-chi had written, in a March issue, on the "reactionary nature" of the capitalists; others had declared, in a February issue, that the capitalists had launched a "ferocious attack" on the working class.

On 10 April, the publication of Study was suspended. The editorial board stated that:

In several recent issues some articles on the question of the capitalists made the mistake of one-sidedness, which is also related to dogmatism and party jargon....The republication of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's On Contradiction awakens us and makes us feel that we must adopt an extremely sober attitude and quickly correct these shortcomings and mistakes.

The change in line apparently resulted in the temporary demotion of propaganda chief Lu Ting-i, whose duties presumably included supervision of Study. Lu is reported to have made a self-criticism in April 1952. Hsi Chung-hsun was later identified as the new propaganda chief.

Fragmentary information indicates that Chen Po-ta publicized the new line for the propaganda department during the shake-up period. In an article in the 21 April issue of the People's Daily, he noted that the party's policy toward the bourgeoisie was "to unite with it, not to economically liquidate it." In the 13 May issue of the People's Daily, he praised Mao's understanding of the "transformation" of contradictions.

The delay in reissuing Study probably reflected Lu Ting-i's demotion and the confusion resulting from it. The editors of the People's Daily on 28 June stated:

When the publication of Study was suspended for a review of its work, we intended to resume publication by June 1952. Inasmuch as preparatory work is still unfinished, we have decided to postpone publication until 1 August.

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The decision on a "soft" line toward China's capitalists was apparently taken concurrently with a decision to adopt a somewhat more moderate policy toward China's intellectuals. The party did not start another major drive against the intellectuals until late 1954, when Kuo Mo-jo stated that "during the past few years....the ideological struggle in learning and literature has been a bit too quiet and unruffled."

New Attacks on the Intellectuals, 1954

In September 1954, Liu Shao-chi, Mao's first lieutenant for party affairs, reported to the National People's Congress on the draft constitution of the Peiping regime. Liu held out the possibility, to the great majority of intellectuals, of becoming "working-class intellectuals," but again made clear that this achievement would require a long-term process of "remolding." Liu called on the state to "rally all intellectuals, except the handful of reactionary intellectuals...., (and) help them to remold their ideology...." Liu cited Mao to the effect that intellectuals "who have distinguished themselves in the service of the people must be respected as valuable assets to the State." This formulation did not assert that the intellectuals in their then current character were to be regarded as major assets, but that remolded intellectuals who had proved their value to the Communist cause would be so regarded. Liu strongly implied that the road ahead for the intellectuals would be rough..

Chou En-lai's emphasis, in his remarks on the intellectuals on the same occasion, was somewhat different. Chou reflected the regime's intention to create its own intellectuals, noting the establishment of "short-term secondary schools in which we are training our new intellectuals--of worker and peasant origin." Chou's account of the results of the remolding of old intellectuals seemed, however, more sanguine than Liu's. Citing "considerable reforms" in education in recent years, Chou described these reforms as "successful." Further, relating these reforms to the "ideological reform of vast numbers of our intellectuals," Chou said flatly that "the work of ideological reform of the intellectuals is effective." Finally, somewhat in contrast to Liu's implication that the usefulness of the intellectuals lay in the future, Chou said that "it is generally admitted" that

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indoctrinated and technically trained intellectuals are "now playing a much more important role" in national construction.

The party in the last few months of 1954 launched two new campaigns--one against classical scholars, one against philosophers. First to be hit was Professor Yu Ping-po's interpretation of the Red Chamber Dream--a famous 18th century Chinese novel--which was criticized for viewing the novel as "mystical, noncommittal, and naturalistic" rather than as a criticism of 18th-century Chinese feudal society.

The vigor and suddenness of the attack seem to have been the work of a competent, orthodox-line group of party leaders. It is possible that Lu Ting-i had been restored to his post of propaganda department chief and that Chou Yang and Chang Chi-chun, later identified as two deputy directors, had been chosen at that time. Veteran deputy director Hu Chiao-mu and People's Daily editor Teng To were also active in the propaganda department's attack.

The attack apparently caught literary circles by surprise. In September and October 1954, the party's major literary magazine (Literature, Wen I Pao) and a Peiping newspaper published articles by two young Chinese. The articles criticized Professor Yu's views. The editors of both publications, however, apparently were unaware that the young Chinese were being used by important party leaders to impose a "hard" line. The editors prefaced the articles with a derogatory remark about the immaturity of the authors' views.

The young critics were supported by their powerful mentors through the People's Daily, which on 23 October 1954 hailed their attack on Yu's interpretation of the Dream as the "first valuable shot" fired against idealist methodology in the study of classical literature "in the past 30 years." Their attack served as the spearhead in a subsequent campaign against "bourgeois idealism" in literary criticism which spread to every part of China.

One of the propaganda department's deputy directors, Hu Chiao-mu, apparently had alerted the propaganda department to the feasibility of using Professor Yu Ping-po as a whipping boy in its attack on literary critics. Yu earlier in 1954 had sent the manuscript of his heretical monograph "Short Discourse on the Red Chamber Dream" to Hu Chiao-mu.

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The latter returned the manuscript to Professor Yu "with many suggestions, asking for it to be rewritten."

Chou Yang, the most aggressive of the deputy directors of the party's propaganda department, apparently had failed to get the word on the Dream case. In December 1954 Chou confessed that the error of Literature, in "suppressing" the youths who had attacked Professor Yu, was also his error.

For the past few years, I have devoted a great part of my energy to cultural administrative work in the government and have paid scanty attention to the question of ideology in literary and art works. I have rarely read any writings in earnest and, as a result, have made insufficient contact with various writers....I should hold myself responsible for the error made by Literature....

The confession appears to reflect Chou's primary responsibility in the propaganda department--that is, as an organizer of writers, rather than an originator of party lines.

The party sought to compel scholars of classical literature to accept its views--that the Dream was a criticism of feudal society--by polemic arguments and threats. Of the many widely publicized articles upholding the "correct" interpretation of the Dream, only Teng To's, appearing in 9 January 1955, seemed to be both ideologically sound and an impressive job of research. Making a case for the novel as one reflecting the beginnings of both a "popular ideology and consciousness" and "capitalist relationships" in 18th century China, the article showed Teng to be a persuasive and accomplished exponent of the party line.

The party leadership's effort to eliminate all modes of thought except the official mode soon turned to the philosophers. The philosopher-baiting campaign was from its beginning in late 1954 directed primarily at the most influential living non-Communist Chinese philosopher, expatriate Hu Shih. Intellectuals were directed to write criticisms of "Hu Shih-ism" and to show why and how his ideas were unacceptable in the "new" China.

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Hu had been attacked in 1951. It was asserted in late 1954, however, that the former attacks had only touched on his reactionary politics and his domination of the academic world of his day, and that his reactionary bourgeois "ideology" had not been "penetratingly analyzed."

Hu's ideas were denounced apparently because the CCP believed that they were shared by many intellectuals. An article in a November 1954 issue of the People's Daily stated that Hu's political ideology "perished with old China, but his pragmatism still exerts considerable influence on our intellectuals." In April 1955, an article in the party's theoretical journal declared that "Hu Shih's influence has not been completely removed....Hu's ideology is a type of bourgeois-imperialistic thought which in the past has sought to obstruct the people's democratic revolution in China and now it may again obstruct the work of socialism. Therefore, to repudiate the ideology of the Hu Shih clique is still necessary."

Hu's belief in individualism, his skepticism about "established" or absolute principles, and his advocacy of extreme democracy approaching anarchy were the CCP's chief targets. The party leadership probably believed that its failure to criticize these ideas might hinder the implementation of drastic social reforms and the use of shock and pressure tactics in socialization and industrialization.

Another influential Chinese philosopher whose ideas were incompatible with the party's program--Liang Shu-ming--was severely pilloried in official publications from December 1954 to November 1955. Instead of regarding industrialization as the panacea for the populace's low standard of living, Liang in the 1930's had placed first importance on the regeneration of China's rural life, economy, and local self-government. He had been sufficiently curious about the Chinese Communists' land policy to pay a visit to Mao Tse-tung at Yen-an in 1938, but he soon returned without having been converted. In all his writings he rejected radical political change and opposed Communism, denying the existence of sharp class divisions in China, and condemning the Communist instigation of class struggle as senseless.

Since 1949, the party had succeeded only in persuading, or compelling, him to make several public confessions. The first, published in October 1954, contained an

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acknowledgment that class struggle could create a stable political power; the second, made in November, showed a flicker of independence; the third, made in an "open letter" to Chinese on Taiwan in February 1955, showed between the lines his continued rejection of official thought.

The criticism campaign against Liang was intensified in July 1955 and continued until November. It coincided with Mao's decision to press on rapidly with the formation of agricultural cooperatives. Several articles in the press implied that Liang had opposed the collectivization of agriculture, and that his defense of peasant welfare had led him to oppose the Five-Year Plan with its strong emphasis on heavy industry.

Early in 1955, party theorist Ai Ssu-chi again apparently failed to get the line, just as he and Chou Yang had slipped up earlier. Ai's first article on Hu Shih, appearing in Study, was evidently milder than the party leadership desired. An abridged and entirely rewritten version of it appeared in People's Daily later in January. In the first version of Ai's article, it was not explicitly denied that there was some good mixed with the "poison" of Hu Shih's ideas; in the second version, it was explicitly denied.

The Hu Feng Case, 1955

In late 1954, the propaganda department's orthodox and hard line leadership also started an attack against Communist party members who still dared to think for themselves. Independent, "subjective-minded," pro-Marxist writer Hu Feng was the chief target of this attack.

Hu Feng had been fairly well known in Communist literary circles as a critic and poet, and as a friend and disciple of China's leading leftist figure in modern literature, Lu Hsun (d. 1936). His prestige in Communist literary circles rivaled that of Chou Yang. Unlike Chou Yang, Hu apparently could not endure servile subjection to a party line. As early as 1945, his relations with other CCP literary leaders in Chungking--Feng Hsueh-feng and Mao Tun--were strained. In 1945, his defense of an article on Subjectivism resulted in a reprimand from Hu Chiao-mu, who, together with other Yen-an-trained writers, apparently has for many years insisted on an essentially Stalinist interpretation of the general political and artistic

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directives contained in Mao's 1942 Yenan Speech. Hu Feng noted in 1949 that the writers in Peiping "seemed to be carrying cangues" /a cangue is a kind of portable wooden collar once used in punishing criminals in China/.

One reason for the sharpness of CCP attacks on Hu Feng probably was his skill in disseminating anti-Maoist views under the cloak of orthodoxy. In August 1950 he wrote to a Shanghai friend, advising him not to display dissatisfaction with the regime's literary policy in letters to the press, but to contribute short articles, putting forward complaints between the lines. In June 1952, when Hu sought to avoid a showdown with Chou Yang on the latter's "mechanical" interpretation of Mao's directives, he advised his friend as follows:

No matter what kind of policy, either soft or hard, Ku I (Chou Yang) adopts, we must use a hard-inside-and-soft-outside attitude toward him.

Hu apparently believed that a more liberal interpretation of Mao's 1942 Speech should have been made by the CCP's Yenan-trained literary authorities, and had informed one of his colleagues that the Speech had been made a "primitive totem." Hu wrote: "The question is not the effect of the Speech itself, it is the way in which incompetent people handle the matter."

Starting in 1952, several of Hu's friends and disciples left his small group and publicly confessed their opposition to the propaganda department's literary line. But Hu, himself, in 1954, rose in party literary circles. "Still regarded as a progressive writer" he became one of the directors of People's Literature, an important party paper. Three of his disciples were employed by important Shanghai literary publishers. With this support, in April 1954 he prepared to "attack" Chou Yang and Feng Hsueh-feng; the latter was at that time the editor of Literature. He sent an outline of a "memorial"--which he was preparing for presentation to the party's central committee--to friends in Peiping, Shanghai, and Nanking.

Not understanding the true nature of Chou Yang's support in the central committee, in July 1954, Hu sent the 300,000-word "memorial" to the party central committee appealing for the removal of the "five daggers" which, he complained, literary dictatorship was thrusting into the brains of writers. These were that (1) writers must have

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a Communist world-view, (2) must submit to thought-re-molding, (3) must "penetrate" the lives of workers, peasants, and soldiers, (4) must produce work of prescribed national form, and (5) must treat only topics declared to be of great significance. He boldly suggested to the central committee a plan of reform, in which he proposed that writers, instead of being indoctrinated by compulsion, should "be allowed to decide on their own schedule of studies," that the official literary papers should be replaced by popular journals edited by established writers with diverse views, and that the Chinese Writers' Union should be abolished.

In effect, Hu called for steps to eliminate the party's "leadership" in literature and art--that is, to eliminate Chou Yang's control. Hu clearly attempted to isolate Chou from central committee support, noting in his memorial that "sectarian rule" was destroying the arts.

It is probable that Hu Feng was marked down for destruction by the party's top leadership after it received his July 1954 memorandum. The party member whom he had attacked--Chou Yang--was to be his executioner. At "struggle" meetings held in November and December 1954, Hu Feng was encouraged by Chou to express his real views further. Chou's call for "free discussion" was supported by Kuo Mo-jo, who noted, however, that all criticism must be "constructive." Hu Feng apparently misinterpreted these and previous statements, and delivered strong attacks on Chou Yang and the People's Daily.

The top party leadership apparently believed that Hu's opposition to the CCP could be demonstrated to other intellectuals if Hu could be led to speak out. Hu's memorial to the central committee was printed as a separate pamphlet of more than 200 pages, and free copies were disseminated together with Literature. His attacks against Chou Yang and the People's Daily were also published in Literature.

After Chou Yang's 8 December attack on Hu Feng, the latter was compelled to express his agreement with Chou's views. But Hu apparently did not submit completely, and this led to stern action against him. In early February 1955, the Chinese Writers Union formally condemned him; on 15 March, Mao Tun, who had been reappointed minister of culture the previous September, called for the "launching of a general campaign against Hu Feng."

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A writer in People's China has claimed that during this period, Hu and his followers "were still treated as being within the ranks of the people," but that after a colleague of Hu's on 13 May made public 34 secret letters written to him by Hu, it became clear that:

These were no friends of the revolution, no literary clique, but a gang of counterrevolutionaries operating within the ranks of the revolutionary people, carrying on a double-faced intrigue under the disguise of progressive writers.

On 25 May 1955, Chou Yang branded Hu and his group as "pretended revolutionaries who had made their way into the party, the army, the government offices, and social organizations." Hu was deprived of all his posts, expelled from the party's literary organizations, and arrested.

Hu apparently has continued to refuse to submit completely. In September 1956, Kuo Mo-jo stated that Hu might be released from prison "if--and it is a very big if--Hu Feng confesses his crimes and shows signs of improvement."

The destruction of Hu Feng was clearly a feather in the cap of Chou Yang. It may also have been a triumph for the head of the propaganda department, Lu Ting-i, as Chou's presumed director. Both men are the Yen-an-trained interpreters of Mao's literary line. Their success wrecked the attempt to officialize a new, more liberal interpretation of Mao's 1942 literary directives.

The Hu Feng campaign was primarily intended to warn intellectuals against questioning the necessity of the CCP's total control of the arts. However, there may have been some sentiment even in the party's central committee for a liberalization of creative work. In sending his memorial to the central committee and later attacking Chou Yang and the People's Daily, Hu Feng apparently acted on his belief that he and his friends would be supported by some central committee members. An editorial in a June 1955 issue of the People's Daily complained that supporters of Hu:

have also infiltrated the Chinese Communist party, with some taking up posts of considerable importance. This group of "Communist party members" are loyal to the counterrevolutionary Hu Feng but are deceitful toward the party.

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The People's Daily has denied that any sympathy for Hu has existed on the central committee level, and in fact no central committee member has been pilloried in connection with Hu's case. While the People's Daily's assertion need not be accepted at face value, it seems fair to conclude that no central committee member was active on Hu's behalf. When Chou Yang directed the attack of the party nucleus in the Chinese Writers' Union against "rightists" during the summer of 1957, his victims were the politically unimportant writers Chen Chi-hsia, Fong Hsueh-feng and Ting Ling. Madame Ting had headed the literature bureau in party central committee's propaganda department, but she was not a member of the central committee.

In the wake of the Hu Feng case, party journals warned during the summer and fall of 1955 against the danger of pollution of the party, particularly by unreliable intellectuals. In June 1955, the People's Daily observed mildly that "more than 90 percent" of party members were of "good character." But this meant that almost 10 percent of CCP members were not so regarded, and that in this respect the party, after four years of "reorganization," was in effect back where it started.

People's Daily in July used the Hu Feng case to demonstrate the need for "further purifying" the party. Later in July, a writer on party affairs for Study, the party's journal of theory, criticized superficial investigation of applicants for party membership, asserting that the principal weakness of such investigations was an emphasis on "professional ability" instead of "virtue," i.e., an emphasis on intellectual skills rather than on political reliability. People's Daily in August editorialized on the need for careful investigation even of "old party members." Then in November 1955, An Tzu-wen, director of the party's organization department and a man to be feared, called for a "ruthless struggle" against class enemies and for a purge of "incorrigibly hostile" elements from the party.

By late 1955 the CCP leadership had badly frightened the intellectuals and had almost certainly reduced their ability and inclination to perform useful work. It had also fortified the existing barriers against their joining the party in significant members.

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SECRETChou En-lai's "Soft" Line, January 1956

On 14 January 1956, Premier Chou En-lai made a long speech to the party central committee and more than 1,100 other party members occupying key posts throughout China, devoted entirely to "questions concerning the intellectuals." That Chou's line was to be the party's policy was made clear in Peiping's further notation that it was given "full support" by some 90 speakers during the week-long meeting and was endorsed by Mao Tse-tung on the last day.

The line introduced by Chou in the January 1956 meeting was the nearest thing to a "soft" line on the question of intellectuals which had ever been taken by a top party leader. Chou seemed to be the right man to introduce such a line. As premier, operating the government for which almost all of the intellectuals worked and which had ambitious plans for them, Chou had the most direct interest in exploiting their technical skills. Moreover, Chou, who, as Communists go, is an intelligent and cultivated man with some appreciation of the arts, had apparently been viewed by many intellectuals as more sympathetic to their cause than other party leaders. Chou's previous statements about the intellectuals, especially those of September 1954, had suggested that there might be some merit in that view--that is, that Chou was less inclined to harry the intellectuals than were party organizers and ideologists such Liu Shao-chi.

Chou's line did not in any way represent a retreat from Communist dogma. Most of the intellectuals who read his speech probably realized, and the others should have realized, that Chou was not proposing that any intellectual be permitted to function as a free intelligence. What he was proposing, in considerable detail, was better treatment of those intellectuals who were willing to work within the limits of Communist dogma--that is, who would not challenge Communist party control of the state or the basic program of the party.

Chou stated, in opening his speech at the January meeting, that the meeting aimed at strengthening party "leadership" over the intellectuals and the "entire work" of science and culture, with a view to enlisting the intellectuals for the enormous tasks facing the regime. Chou stated the party's effort in terms of a struggle against "rightist conservatism," in accordance with the "proposal" of Mao Tse-tung. Chou cited, among other things, the decision (which

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was Mao's) greatly to increase the rate of socialization of agriculture. Thus, those who were hostile to the party's effort to get maximum mileage out of the intellectuals were placed immediately in the position of being "rightist conservatives" opposed to Mao Tse-tung--a position no party member in his right mind would willingly occupy. Chou further remarked--which turned out to be incorrect--that "opposition to rightist conservatism" would be the theme of the party's eighth congress later in 1956.

Chou reviewed the types of contribution to the regime's cause which the intellectuals were capable of making, and said, as he had in 1954, that they "have become important elements in all aspects of life in our country." Chou stated the "fundamental problem" as being that the intellectuals were inadequate, for the regime's purposes, in number, in skills, and in ideology. He then declared that the development of the intellectuals--presumably in all three respects--was being obstructed by "certain unreasonable" practices on the part of party members.

Chou described "most" of the intellectuals as having become a "component of the working class," a departure from the previous view--expressed by Mao and others--that they were to be regarded generally as a part of the petty bourgeoisie. Chou then made a plea for recognition of their general reliability, much as he had in 1954. He asserted that about 40 percent of the "high-level intellectuals" (estimated by him as about 100,000 persons) strongly supported the Chinese Communist party and the Peiping regime, another 40 percent supported the party and regime but lacked fervor, and only 20 percent fell in the categories of "backward" or "undesirable." This description of the intellectuals--as 80 percent reliable--was in sharp contrast to statements by other party leaders in 1957 after the nasty surprise of the intellectuals' response to the "hundred flowers" campaign.

Chou went on to criticize those who underestimated the ideological progress of the intellectuals and their importance to the socialist cause. He derided those who reasoned that intellectuals were not "a component of the working class... since work in production is performed by workers and technical guidance may be provided by Soviet experts." Chou declared his opposition also to any tendency toward "one-sided conciliation" of intellectuals, but his heavy fire was directed against the anti-intellectuals.

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Chou proposed a number of practical measures to improve the lot of the intellectuals. He mentioned first the need to assign intellectuals properly, i.e., to their fields of specialization, to avoid "the waste of the most precious property of the state." He asked that the intellectuals be given "our confidence and support, which they deserve." Chou called for the biographical background of intellectuals to be "correctly evaluated...so as to release a number of them from prolonged, unjustified suspicion....Only a small number of them are politically questionable." Chou further asked that nonparty intellectuals not only be given important posts but be permitted to exercise genuine power. Further, Chou said, there should be an improvement in the working conditions of intellectuals (in particular, freeing them from profitless conferences and administrative matters), and an improvement as well in their living conditions, such as better housing and pay and faster promotion.

Chou went on to ask the party to help the intellectuals in their "self-reform." He called for the purge of the "very small percentage of counterrevolutionary and other bad elements" among the intellectuals, and for continued criticism of "the few" who oppose or misunderstand socialism. In a gesture which must have been particularly welcome to the intellectuals, Chou said that the struggle against counterrevolution in China "must not involve" those whose relationship with counterrevolutionaries had been or remained "merely social." In sum, Chou said, the party would work to "reform the backward," to "educate the neutral...to become progressive," and to make the progressive into "red specialists." (This latter phrase is similar to the formulation--"red and expert"--later used by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, and means "politically reliable and technically proficient." Liu and Teng on one hand, and Chou on the other, have been united in this objective, but there have been possibly important differences in their views of the party's progress toward it.)

Chou admitted that the party in the past few years--meaning, probably, since 1951--had "very rarely" admitted intellectuals, and described this policy as "closed-doorism." Chou said that "we"--presumably the party leadership--now (January 1956) think it "proper" to admit one third of the high-level intellectuals, i.e., about 35,000 of them, to the party by 1962.

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Only in the concluding portion of his speech did Chou make clear the compelling reason for the new emphasis in the party's line on intellectuals. It was the Peiping regime's "backwardness" in modern science, as contrasted with the rest of the world's rapid advance. Chou said that the regime "must try to catch up...must make our greatest effort to win this race," in order to be victorious over the West "both in peaceful competition and aggressive wars....". Chou derided Peiping's practice of sending high-school graduates to the USSR rather than scientists for advanced training, remarking that under this policy Peiping would never be able to improve its position of "dependence and apprenticeship." Chou called for certain other improvements, such as inviting bloc scientists to establish research organs in Peiping, training Chinese under Soviet scientific and technical personnel then in China, assigning outstanding Chinese scientists and students to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, formulation of a national plan for scientific research, and so on.

Chou concluded his speech by proposing a division of labor with respect to the various tasks outlined in his speech. "Administrative" questions concerning intellectuals would be handled by a Specialists' Bureau under Chou's State Council (cabinet). (This bureau was soon set up, under a protégé of Chou's, Chi Yen-ming.) The handling--by the government departments concerned--of questions of a "political" character, and questions related to ideological reform and disposition of counterrevolutionaries, would be "supervised" by the party's propaganda department, which all along had had the largest role in indoctrinating intellectuals. The work of admitting intellectuals to the party would be handled by the party's organization department, in coordination with the propaganda department. The party, rather than the government, would thus continue to have the final word on the question of the reliability of the intellectuals.

It seems very probable, in view of Chou's position in the government, his own character, and his previous statements, that the line taken in Chou's speech was one which he personally approved. Whether he, or instead Mao Tse-tung, first broached the matter to the party's other top leaders, is uncertain. The confident tone and the willingness to take a chance were equally features of Mao's decision on agricultural socialization a few months earlier. It is fair to assume, at a minimum, that Mao approved of the new line. It cannot be assumed, however, that other party leaders at this level approved of it, and both the previous records and subsequent

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actions of some of them suggest that they were reluctant to see even this much of "liberalization." The other key figures in the politburo's inner core, where the policy would probably have been originated for submission to the full politburo, were Liu Shao-chi and Chen Yun, and, probably, Teng Hsiao-ping, although Teng was not revealed to be a member of this elite body--then called the secretariat, now called the standing committee--until September 1956. Chen Yun, as Chou's senior deputy premier and close associate, would probably have stood willingly with Mao and Chou. However, Liu and Teng, as directors of the party's organizational and ideological work, were (and remain) responsible for the party's purity; and Liu directly, and Teng indirectly, had previously indicated their sensitivity to the potential of the intellectuals for polluting the proletariat's vessel. Neither Liu nor Teng had major responsibilities in the government, and neither could be expected to be as sensitive to Chou's problems as Chou was. The reservations of Liu and Teng, at this early stage, may have been expressed to Mao and Chou in some such form as this: 'We don't have as much confidence in the intellectuals as you do, and we don't think that the new line will be as productive as you do, but it may work if it's handled very carefully.' In any case, Chou En-lai became personally identified with the new line.

The propaganda department's support for Chou's line was prompt. The People's Daily the next day published an article by a Peking University philosophy professor in which he noted that "the very great majority" of intellectuals are receptive to party leadership. People's Daily then published a Tsinghua University professor's assurance that the intelligentsia's ideological reform had been "tremendous" since 1949. Other professors submitted similar articles in subsequent January and February issues.

Articles in other publications stressed the need to improve party-intelligentsia working relations, and, in so doing, pushed the question of political reliability into the background. A writer in the 3 February issue of one of the regime's major economic journals, New Construction, asserted that since "all" specialists and scholars support the CCP "wholeheartedly," their problem now is "how to gain party help and guidance in their profession." He stressed the need for each specialist and scholar to improve himself in his profession "along his own line," which means, he stated, "the blooming of all flowers."

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Anticipating opposition in lower party ranks to Chou's program, the propaganda department attacked young zealots for advocating total ideological conformity. A writer in China Youth criticized young Communist party members for having placed "one-sided" stress on reforming veteran professors, neglecting methods which might be used to "develop the professors' special talents and learn from them." They were advised that in combating idealism "veteran professors should not be regarded as targets of criticism and reform."

Complaints were made against Youth League members who baited scientists at Peking University. A writer in China Youth complained that there prevailed at the university "a sort of 'public opinion,' under the pressure of which young instructors are afraid of being condemned as 'individualistic' or 'ignoring politics.'" Consequently, they hesitate "to engage wholeheartedly in their research work." The writer noted that although the university's president had, following Chou En-lai's speech, launched a campaign to enable instructors and students to pursue their studies without intimidation, some League cadres--who were wont to quote Stalin's dictum that "A scientist must also be an active politician"--persisted in stressing politics.

Mao Inaugurates "Liberalization," Spring 1956

The Mao-Chou policy of gaining the confidence of the intelligentsia by relieving it of fears of political persecution was reflected in Peiping's treatment of the de-Stalinization issue. On April 1956, the People's Daily printed an editorial, "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," which expressed the views of an enlarged meeting of the politburo. The editorial, critical of the Soviet handling of de-Stalinization, attempted in part to show that the CCP had not been guilty of "Stalinist" mistakes after Mao Tse-tung became its dominant figure in 1935. It stated that a major mistake in the CCP's early years had resulted from a crude application, by dogmatists, of Stalin's dictum that middle-of-the-road forces must be smashed. In consequence, "instead of isolating the real enemy we had isolated ourselves." The point was made that the middle-of-the-road forces which the party had erroneously attacked were the national bourgeoisie and the democratic parties--the groups which represent the majority of China's intellectuals.

The editorial apparently was intended in part to be viewed as another sign of the party's willingness to permit

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a sector of intellectual life to go on without the degree of interference which had characterized Stalin's leadership of the USSR. It contained passages which seemed designed to encourage the intelligentsia to believe that the regime should be viewed as authoritarian but not totalitarian. That is, it was to be viewed as a dictatorship which could not hope for total standardization of thought "among the people" because contradictions would continue to exist "between idealism and materialism in a socialist and even a Communist society...; there will still be people with comparatively correct thinking and others with comparatively incorrect thinking."

Mao's hand can be detected in the cited statement. It is a new gloss in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, explicitly denying the perfectibility of human nature which had been implicit in Soviet doctrine on the Communist state of the future. (This gloss and the editorial's statement that "the existence of contradictions between the individual and the collective in a Socialist society is nothing strange" apparently were viewed as unorthodox by Soviet leaders. They were omitted from Pravda's 7 April reprint of the editorial.) The repudiation of the Soviet view provided Mao and the party leadership with a basis for a "soft" policy toward expressions of idealism--a policy which was designed gradually to cure a long-lasting disease rather than forcibly to extirpate a counterrevolutionary ideology. Intellectuals apparently were expected to infer that if an absolute harmony of views was held by the politburo to be inconceivable even for the future stage of Communism, the politburo believed it even less likely to exist in present-day China.

On 2 May in an unpublished speech, Mao took another step along the "soft" line, calling on the party and government to relax the rigid structures under which intellectuals had been working in the arts and sciences. He sloganized the new line in an eight-character couplet--"let all the flowers bloom, let various schools of thought contend." The couplet was written in the classical style to evoke enthusiasm among intellectuals, and had an emotional power which Chou En-lai's more restrained and precise statements of January did not have. Mao's speech inaugurated "liberalization," whereas Chou's had simply promised better treatment to docile intellectuals.

Although the propaganda department had been given the job of selling the Chou line to the intellectuals, it does

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not seem to have promoted a new atmosphere of greater intellectual freedom until Mao personally demanded it. Mao emerged again in the eyes of the populace and the party rank and file as the bold pioneer who had conquered a new frontier of policy.

Propaganda chief Lu Ting-i, addressing a gathering of Communist party members, natural and social scientists, doctors, writers, and artists on 26 May, told his audience that his speech would express "my personal understanding" of the CCP's policy toward work in the sciences and the arts. This speech was, however, almost certainly an authorized explication of Mao's 2 May speech, and may be read almost as a published version of Mao's speech.

Lu's speech was generally in line with Chou's, calling for better treatment of intellectuals within the limits of Communist dogma. However, Lu implied that the definition of official thought should be enlarged to protect many intellectuals with independent ideas. He attempted to make clear that the CCP was now authorizing and encouraging the expression of divergent views. He noted that the arts could not advance "if there is 'only one flower in bloom'" and that China's history had shown "stagnation" in the sciences to be the result of repressed discussion.

Lu went on to provide a shelter for intellectuals with independent--but not antiparty--ideas by introducing Mao's 1949* ideological formula: "freedom within the ranks of the people." He advocated "broadening" this freedom to the point where it would include permission for intellectuals to "publicize idealism." He noted, in line with the 5 April People's Daily editorial on de-Stalinization, but more liberally than Chou, that as realists Communists recognize that the contradiction between materialism and idealism will remain in the "Socialist and the Communist society" and that ideological struggle among the "people" must be "rigidly distinguished" from the struggle against counterrevolutionaries. He stated that any attempt to solve the struggle

*In On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (July 1949), Mao promised freedom to those within the "ranks of the people," i.e., workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie. The last two groups have an "idealist" world-view, however, which should be dispelled by thought remolding.

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between backward idealism and progressive materialism with "administrative orders" cannot be effective. Only through "open debates" can materialism "gradually" overcome idealism.

Lu assured prospective opponents and die-hards in the party that the CCP was acting from a position of strength in urging adoption of the "hundred flowers" policy. He cited four conditions which guaranteed the policy's success: (1) the "decisive victory" of socialization, (2) the "fundamental change" in the political thought of intellectuals, (3) the "great weakening" of enemies, and (4) the "great strengthening" of official thought. It reflected an optimism similar to that expressed by Chou, when he asserted in January that "most" of the intellectuals were politically reliable.

Enlarging upon the definition of official thought, Lu introduced a new element in party-intelligentsia relations. This was an apparent intention to stop forcing scientists to write confessions against their professional convictions and to allow them to reply to criticisms of their ideas on academic matters without fear of being intimidated into silence by "the method of administrative order." The general principle that the minority must follow the majority must no longer be applied in nonpolitical, scientific debates, Lu noted.

The minority who believe in something different should be allowed to retain their own views, and the principle of making the minority yield to the majority must not be enforced. After due criticism and discussion, those who make mistakes on academic problems must not be forced to write articles to review their mistakes if they themselves are not willing. In academic circles, if a different view is brought up after a certain academic problem has been closed, such a view should still be allowed to be discussed.

Lu's conclusion is thus that all honest workers in the arts and sciences should be free from attack.

In a brief passage Lu made it clear, however, that in liberalizing criticism and in relaxing the tight controls on intellectuals, the party leadership would not permit freedom in political matters. Hu Shih (now free in the United States) and Hu Feng (now in jail in Communist China) were criticized for being counterrevolutionary in politics

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as well as idealistic in ideology. The criterion for distinguishing between a political idealist who is counter-revolutionary and an idealist who is "within the ranks of the people" would thus continue to be general support of the party's policies. Lu reminded nonparty intellectuals, quoting from Chou En-lai's January speech, that cooperation is a two-way street and that an attitude of reservation toward socialism would work against the new policy.

Lu gave a practical reason for the party's call for "blossoming" in literature and art and for "contention" in science. The CCP hoped to enrich China's art and enable scientists to "catch up" with advanced world levels. The new policy was, moreover, "an important guarantee" for the successful formulation and implementation of 12-year plans in natural science and the humanities.

Lu's effort to expand the definition of official thought and provide a free market of ideas in the arts and sciences apparently necessitated an innovation in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Like Stalin, he called for free discussion in science. He departed from the views of Stalin and the present Soviet leadership, however, in explicitly denying that natural science has a class character. It is a new concept which, according to Lu, the CCP had "groped out" in the course of struggle.

Natural sciences including medicine have no class character. They have their own laws of development....It is erroneous to put class labels such as "feudal," "capitalist," "socialist," "proletarian," or "bourgeois" on certain medical theories or theories in biology or other natural sciences....We must never believe this fallacy. Some people fall for it because of their sectarian views. Some fall for it because they want to stress the need of learning advanced Soviet science.

Lu's remark that the natural sciences have their "own laws of development" apparently was intended to imply that even the CCP may not be able to foresee which scientific theory will prove right and which wrong. Accordingly, scientists were free to advance all academically feasible theories or techniques, even those of capitalist states, for Lu also made a clear distinction between the "reactionary systems" of capitalist states and "what is valuable in their management, science, and technology."

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Turning to literature and art, Lu stated briefly that the CCP considered socialist realism as the best "but by no means the only" method of creation. He asserted that the party had laid down "no restriction" on subjects to write about because "puritanical rules" would only lead to suffocation of artistic work and the emergence of formalism and vulgarity. The only new element in Lu's approach to the arts appeared to be that of permitting descriptions of "bad" people and heretical views--previously such descriptions were taken as a sign of implicit opposition to the party--in order to contrast these with "good" people and correct views.

Lu coupled his doctrinal rationale for liberalization with a practical one, complaining that sharp criticism of specialists had "frightened them" and hampered their work. He directed party specialists to listen to the criticism of nonparty experts and told them to devote more time to "study." He was sympathetic to the view of a scientist who had written to him, requesting that incompetent researchers be prevented from using the term "idealistic" as a club to shatter demands for careful, experimentally verifiable research.

Lu proposed that the form of criticism be changed from attempting to "kill with one blow" (reserved exclusively for counterrevolutionaries) to comradely advice.

It is common for good men to make mistakes. Nobody in the world can be completely free from mistakes. Such mistakes must be rigidly distinguished from counterrevolutionary statements. Criticism of such mistakes should be well-intentioned, calm, and cool-headed; reasoning should take the whole matter into consideration and criticism should proceed only from unity with a view to reaching unity.

Lu was advocating a corrective method, free from the Stalinist compulsion to shoot political opponents or dishonor their names. Implying falsely that Mao Tse-tung had always been a lenient confessor of misguided comrades, Lu recommended as models the mild criticism which Mao had directed against Chen Shao-yu and Po Ku in the early 1940's and which the CCP politburo had directed against "Comrade Stalin...who had more merits than mistakes" in April 1956. This form of criticism was "neither overdone nor undercooked"

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and was designed to "benefit many people." Applied to intellectuals "who work honestly," tolerance should be basic in the party's approach, for it is "impossible" to carry out "creative work without committing mistakes."

In sum, Lu's speech was in line with Mao's desire to fire the imagination of intellectuals and commit them emotionally to the party's goals; and it was in line with Chou En-lai's promise of better treatment of those intellectuals who were willing to work within the limits of party control. It went beyond Chou's speech in providing a doctrinal basis for a relaxation of party control over theories and thinkers in the natural sciences. It seems clear that, in May 1956, Mao was convinced that Chou's speech had been merely a first step which had not resulted in the desired momentum for gaining the allegiance of intellectuals.

Uncertainty About "Liberalization," June 1956 - February 1957

Lu Ting-i had called for free discussion and had implied that even the party might not be able to distinguish a right theory in science from a wrong one--a view which led some intellectuals to probe the limits of free discussion. The first response of regime spokesmen to this probing was to give Lu's speech a conservative twist.

"Liberalization" speeches made at the National People's Congress in June 1956 were sprinkled with reminders of the party's monopoly of power. In a speech published in the People's Daily, Kuo Mo-jo told the congress that the party's policy was to improve ideological studies and to promote "correct contention," defining contention as "socialist" competition. Socialist competition had been demanded during the Hu Feng campaign and intellectuals could hardly avoid the inference that the "contention" which Kuo now desired in the name of the party was the same protective mimicry which had repressed independent thinkers in previous years.

There is some evidence that the propaganda department itself was unsure of the limits of liberalization, trying out various definitions of "contending" in an effort to establish a formula which would not again alienate the intelligentsia. In the 14 July issue of People's Daily, the minister of culture defended Kuo Mo-jo's conservative interpretation of Lu Ting-i's speech. He attacked "fanciful" schools of thought--such as one scholar's view that the

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ancient-period Chinese philosopher Mo Tzu was not Chinese but Indian--which contradict "publicly recognized conclusions." He declared that Kuo's demand for "correct contention" did not restrict the party's new policy. However, a writer in the same issue of People's Daily opposed the hard interpretation, describing Kuo's demand for correct contention and intensified indoctrination as "irrelevant talk." He sought to strengthen his argument by citing Lu's promise of freedom to publicize idealism. Since the articles were juxtaposed on the same page, it appeared that the propaganda department was seeking to gauge the reaction to both views and later make a final ruling.

The propaganda department apparently decided in late July to use a soft interpretation of Lu Ting-i's speech. An editorial in the People's Daily on 21 July ruled that there always will be an "Incorrect element" in correct contention and that proponents of different views need not play the same tune like instruments in an orchestra, but should be permitted to create their own tunes, provided that their "music is not counter-revolutionary." Permission to "doubt or criticize Marxist dialectics" was granted. Apparently only political criticism of the regime was ruled out.

The soft interpretation prevailed after the 21 July editorial had set the tone. There were few indications, however, that intellectuals were being brought out of their demoralized state and up to a condition of high working morale.

The propaganda department's first significant experiment with its soft interpretation of Lu Ting-i's speech was linked to the CCP's effort to expose and reduce bureaucratic practices in its ranks. Writing in the party's literary journal--People's Literature--Communist party member Wang Meng in September 1956 described the loss of enthusiasm among old cadres--"who neither love nor hate, and are interested only in a good record"--and the shattered party-spirit of a young cadre, "whose way of thinking comes from Russian films; but real party life is different." Wang's short story, A New Young Man Arrives at the Organization Department, was roughly similar to V. Dudintsev's novel Not By Bread Alone, the first installment of which was published in the USSR in August 1956, preceding New Young Man by one month.

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The use of fiction rather than the press to attack party shortcomings was unique for the CCP. There was more risk involved, for expressions of party defects in literature tend to indict not individuals but the entire party environment. For example, Wang described bureaucratic habits and disillusionment among members of the organization department in a Peiping district party committee as follows:

In the whole atmosphere there is something like dust in the air. You can smell it but you can't lay hold of it....We /veterans/ created the new life but the new life does not fire our imagination.

Received with enthusiasm in some quarters and with outraged criticism in others, the short story apparently stirred the "open" debate which the propaganda department had envisaged as a method of curing lethargy in party ranks. Publication of readers' reactions, however, was postponed until the eighth party congress had been held in mid-September.

Major speakers at the party congress underplayed and almost ignored the "hundred flowers" policy.

In his brief reference to the policy in his report, Liu Shao-chi expressed support for it and agreed with Lu Ting-i's remark that the CCP should not rely on "administrative orders" to exercise its leadership. However, Liu stressed the need for long-term remolding of intellectuals from the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, in calling for the party to enlist the services of existing intellectuals while training a great number of its own, he warned of the danger that the bourgeois ideas of the intellectuals would "corrupt the ranks of the proletariat." Unlike Chou En-lai, Liu did not encourage the recruitment of intellectuals for party membership, and, unlike Lu Ting-i, he left no room for criticism of Communist doctrine.

The central committee resolution on Liu's report set forth the party's position. The resolution stated that the party must "steadily carry out" the "hundred flowers" policy, and must "unite" with the intellectuals while educating and remolding them.

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A second major speaker at the congress was Teng Hsiao-ping, Liu's principal lieutenant for party affairs. Teng did not once mention the "hundred flowers" policy. Teng did call for the party to admit qualified intellectuals, but his emphasis throughout his report was on the need for careful selection and supervision of members.

The third major speaker was Chou En-lai, whose approach was less cautious than Liu's or Teng's. Speaking at length of the regime's need for intellectuals, and endorsing the "hundred flowers" policy, Chou said nothing of the need for a long-term remolding of intellectuals.

The Second Five-Year Plan proposal adopted by the congress reflected Chou's position primarily, just as the central committee resolution on Liu's report had reflected Liu's primarily. The FYP proposal, endorsing both the "hundred flowers" policy and the policy of "uniting, educating, and transforming" intellectuals, went on to state that they should be "encouraged to think independently and to discuss freely," and that they should receive better treatment in many ways from the regime.

To some extent, Liu and Teng on one hand, as the "party" men, and Chou on the other as the "government" man, had complementary functions. That is, Liu and Teng assured the party that the door would remain closed to unorthodox ideologies and their bourgeois proponents; while Chou assured nonparty intellectuals working with government personnel that there would remain a useful and more comfortable place for them. But the difference in function seemed to reflect also a difference in thinking.

Peiping's response to the Hungarian developments and the Soviet-Yugoslav debate was to support Moscow in strong terms. The qualifications which the CCP leadership attached to this support did not soften its attack on revisionists. The "hundred flowers" policy was lost in the mass of statements on the irreducible elements in Marxist doctrine, and a conservative interpretation of the policy appeared to be dominant. Peiping's long statement of 28 December reaffirmed the Chinese Communist view that the "road to socialism"--for Peiping or any other Communist regime--necessitates essential fidelity to the Soviet model in constructing a new society, and a close alliance with the Soviet party and state. It thus rejected key

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features of Yugoslav domestic and foreign policy and made clear to the Poles that the Chinese--while supporting Polish freedom within the bloc--did not approve all features of Gomulka's liberalization program.

While the need to support Moscow had forced China's version of de-Stalinization into the background, a pretense of free discussion was continued in connection with Wang Meng's short story, New Young Man. "Spontaneous" letters to the editor in the December issue of Literary Studies (carefully screened by the propaganda department) apparently were meant to draw attention to the party's desire to champion free discussion even after the Hungarian developments. Some contributors favored the views of the shocked New Young Man, others denied that old cadres were degenerate.

But the "hundred flowers" policy was not extensively discussed until January--a time when the CCP was criticizing middle-school students for having "wrong thoughts" on intrabloc relations and university students for over-emphasizing "democracy and even individual freedom above collective interest." A relatively unknown Communist playwright, Chen Chi-tung, and three colleagues called for a halt to liberalization in literature and drama. In an article in the 7 January 1957 issue of the People's Daily, Chen complained that in 1956 less and less mention was made of writing for the workers, peasants, and soldiers--an attempt to invoke Mao's formula and authority--as well as Socialist realism in writing. He was aware of the subtle attempt by some writers to discuss only realism, not Socialism, or merely "realism of the Socialist era." He noted that the charge of "formalism"--that is, stereotyped phrases and descriptions--was incorrectly used to oppose the use of literature to serve politics, and criticized short essays--an apparent attack on New Young Man--which register "dissatisfaction and disillusionment." He was firm in his demand for drama which is simultaneously new and Socialist.

There are other indications that the propaganda department had decided to advance a conservative interpretation of "hundred flowers." Its theoretical journal Study on 18 February 1957 printed an article by a lesser Communist writer flatly stating that:

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Whatever the ideology or standpoint, we absolutely cannot allow on our soil propaganda counter to Socialist construction.

The writer then declared that "A stand of patriotism and support of Socialism is the minimum requirement for letting all flowers bloom and all schools of thought contend." His complaints clearly reflected the department's concern over liberal interpretations which, for example, led cinematography workers in Shanghai to reject Communists from their crews. Thus, roughly one week before Mao Tse-tung gave his speech on contradictions, the propaganda department was stressing a conservative interpretation of "hundred flowers."

Mao Reaffirms a Liberal "Hundred Flowers," Early 1957

Mao Tse-tung's [] speeches of 27 February and 12 March, to a meeting of the Supreme State Conference and to a national conference on propaganda work, were apparently directed to the party as a whole, and were not concerned primarily with intellectuals. However, [] Mao in these speeches reaffirmed his "hundred flowers" policy in unprecedentedly liberal terms.

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Mao apparently sought to impress on all party personnel the need to handle popular grievances in such a way as to avoid exacerbating them. Although Mao was aware that thousands of Hungarians had almost overnight been stirred to anti-Communist action, he apparently did not fear the development of large-scale opposition to his regime; [] 90 percent of the Chinese people were favorably disposed to the CCP. Mao's evident interest, similar to that of Chou En-lai a year earlier in proposing better treatment of docile intellectuals, was that of enlisting all available talent to speed the regime's very ambitious program of economic and scientific development; Mao [] said just that in the February speech.

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In instructing the party On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, Mao displayed originality on two points. The first was the realistic admission that a "contradiction"--albeit "nonantagonistic," or non-fundamental--exists between the leaders and the populace in a Socialist state. Taking their cue from Zhdanov's June 1947 statement that "contradictions exist" in a Socialist state where criticism and self-criticism replaced

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the class struggle as society's motive force, Soviet theorists had discussed contradictions in the USSR. However, their general descriptions avoided what Mao later made explicit: that there is a leader-populace contradiction in Socialist countries.*

The second original view was that the Communist party requires the constant stimulus of nonparty criticism--including even hostile criticism--to retain its alertness and strength. The Soviet view has been and continues to be that the Communist party has sufficient inner resources to provide whatever rectification or self-criticism is necessary.

Mao [] made the following points about the "hundred flowers" policy: that this policy was not a luxury but a necessity; that Marxism itself would profit from free discussions, as strong flowers cannot be grown in hot-houses; that views hostile to the Communist world view would not find a fertile soil in China; and that criticism of the "hundred flowers" policy was shortsighted and incorrect. 25X1

[] Mao, on this last point, said that 90 percent of the party's "high-ranking cadres" had opposed his introduction of the "hundred flowers" policy, but that he had insisted on it because he felt certain he was right. As it turned out, Mao considerably overestimated the regime's popular support, and those who had been doubtful of the policy--or at least of Mao's presentation of it--were vindicated. 25X1

No [] report [] that Mao, in either the February or the March speech, set forth the criteria for acceptable criticism--which clearly prohibit free discussion--appearing in the official version of his speech published in June (and 25X1

*Khrushchev's April 1957 denial that this contradiction is present in the Soviet Union indicates that the Soviet leaders preferred to have the regime's theorists treat Mao's remark with silence implying dissent. The Soviet leaders have acted to prevent a Chinese monopoly over the discussion and interpretation of contradictions by repeating the views of Lenin and Stalin. When in Kommunist (Nov 2, 1957) A. Sobolev finally attempted to put Soviet theorists straight on how to discuss Mao's theory, he stated that nonantagonistic contradictions existed in Socialist society between action of the people and "low-level" leadership on the part of "a number of organizations." This watered-down statement is one to which Mao might now (in 1958) subscribe.

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Mao's speech appeared to represent an important change of emphasis in party policy. Indeed, the propaganda department was so strongly committed to an opposite emphasis that as late as 28 February--one day after Mao's speech--the propaganda department of a provincial party committee in the Northeast "unanimously" supported the hard-line article by Chen Chi-tung which Mao had derided in his speech. The provincial committee found that Chen's article presented points of view "which were all correct."

The propaganda department responded quickly to Mao's renewed stress on liberalization. Lu Ting-i's personal friend, Lin Mo-han, set a moderate tone for discussions of literary works which were critical of the party. In an important article in the 12 March issue of People's Daily, Lin, unlike other critics, presented a balanced critique of Wang Meng's A New Young Man Arrives at the Organization Department. He attacked the critics for imputing evil motives to the author for his realistic view of party mistakes and complained that "dogmatism"--which was "still rampant"--contravened the "hundred flowers" policy and damaged the creative spirit of authors. On the other hand, he criticized the author for suggesting that the new life "itself" can corrode a party member, that isolation from the masses is a praiseworthy attitude, and that the old life may not be vanquished by the bright new life.

Similarly, Chou Yang's ward, Minister of Culture Shen Yen-ping, in the 18 March People's Daily reassured party workers that the appearance of "weeds"--literature devoid of ideological character, or of bad character--should not cause consternation. He then attacked Mao's specific target, Chen Chi-tung, for being "worried and even terrified" for using dogmatic methods of criticism and giving the wrong impression that the "hundred flowers" policy was harmful. Shen stated that Chen's approach was dangerous, as "it splashes cold water in the face of intellectuals, who are inspired and animated by the policy on the hundred flowers and schools of thought."

Shen then said that it is impractical to prevent writers from writing until they are indoctrinated, that free discussion

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is "our" way of indoctrinating intellectuals in Marxism, since thought reform is a complex and "delicate" task.

Shen's statement--which may have been worked out with Chou Yang--was in line with Mao's apparent belief that skill and tact must replace bullying methods in winning adherents to the party's program and official thought.

Chinese Communist party leaders, aside from Mao and his spokesman of the propaganda department, remained silent about "contradictions" through the month of March.

Confusion and Opposition in the Party, April 1957

Throughout April, there were continuing indications of confusion about Mao's line on "contradictions," and of opposition specifically to the "hundred flowers" policy. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the various versions of Mao's position were in conflict with patterns of thought and action established in the party for many years.

Perhaps of most importance, there was no precedent for recognizing the existence of abiding conflicts of interest between the leaders and the led in a Socialist society. The orthodox position was that there could be no such conflict between leaders and led, and that other conflicts in society were manifestations of an uncompleted class struggle, to be resolved by means appropriate to a struggle. Those party leaders who had opposed Mao's line had presumably argued in this fashion.

As a corollary, there was no precedent for encouraging significant criticism of the Communist world-view. "Criticism and self-criticism" had long been employed by the CCP, but in the Soviet form. Liu Shao-chi had stated the orthodox view in 1942 in discussing "innerparty struggle": this struggle is not an open debate aiming at the attainment of truth; the party already possesses the truth; the task of the struggle is to bring into the open tendencies in the party which run counter to the truth, and to eliminate them. "Struggle" is a method for achieving uniformity of views, not a device for encouraging independent views. This view of the proper function of criticism had also prevailed in the party's adaptation of innerparty struggle, since 1949, to the national scene. That is, like "criticism from below" in the USSR, the criticism permitted by the CCP to come

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from outside the party had been directed by the party itself, and directed against individuals or specific instances of mismanagement; it had never risked criticism of "Marxism-Leninism" in theory or practice.

Thus a Communist official hearing Mao's speeches--or the various oral versions of them--might reasonably have been concerned. Mao's new line would take away his belief in his total justification as a leader of the new society, would expose his most cherished convictions to attack, and would commit him to deal kindly with the attackers. To the orthodox--not merely to recent graduates of the Marx-Lenin Institute but also to party seniors long trained by Mao himself in a much more rigid and self-righteous view--Mao's 1957 line must have seemed a very dangerous novelty indeed.

The People's Daily throughout April tried to reassure the doubtful both inside and outside the party. One editorial observed that "not a few" party members had tried to prove that there was "danger" in Mao's policy, and had "advised" the party to change it quickly. The editorial rejected these fears as unworthy of the new China where Marxist thought was dominant.

Another editorial declared that "preliminary results are good," reaffirmed the "hundred flowers" as a "long-term guiding principle," and derided as dogmatists and sectarians "certain people" who held contrary views. Another editorial asserted that the encouragement of criticism would not make "contradictions" worse, as some alleged, but would merely be temporarily embarrassing to the organs criticized.

Similarly, Chou Yang hailed the "positive developments" under the "hundred flowers," and rebuked party cadres by noting that many intellectuals had cast off the fetters of bourgeois idealism only to be re-fettered by the dogmatism of party administrators. The latter, Chou said, still did not realize that there was "nothing to fear" in the continued existence of differing ideologies. Chou rejected "pretended belief and blind obedience" and declared that "we" (the party) believe that "truth can only develop in a struggle with untruth."

Chou in that interview distinguished two "deviations" which were impeding the new policy. The doctrinaire error was to reject the "hundred flowers" in order to hide weaknesses, while the opportunist error was to seize on the policy as a means of discrediting the regime's achievements. Chou's formulation seems not to have been very helpful. People's Daily noted

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shortly thereafter that cadres in Shanghai were so afraid of committing either a leftist or rightist error that they felt "bound, hand and foot."

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Chou Yang's "we"--the party--was clearly not unanimous, and some exponents of the doctrinaire (leftist) error may have been high in the party.

A few intellectuals responded to the propaganda department's efforts in April to induce them to speak out boldly. One professor of theoretical physics wrote that the CCP was "not now" capable of leadership in certain technical fields. Another wrote that some CCP members feared the "hundred flowers" because they were "unprepared to defeat in debate" the defenders of idealism. This same professor attacked the party's decision to adopt a Latin phonetic alphabet.

The propaganda department went to considerable lengths to encourage this trend. For example, People's Daily printed a professor's observation that Marxist social science had not advanced since 1895. The newspaper's editors replied that "everyone knows" Lenin developed Marxism with his theory of imperialism, but the editors did not attack the professor personally, called for a discussion of both views, and later printed his letter of defense. The treatment of this professor was meant as an example to party members "unduly" frightened by heresy. Cadres were told "not to change color when discussing the fierce tiger."

A top-level reaffirmation of Mao's line came on 20 April from Peng Chen, a politburo member and mayor and party first secretary of Peiping, in a speech to a conference of propaganda workers. Peng, known for his bold manner, declared roundly that any man who trembles at blooming and contending is "a coward and a man of no talent." He went on to assert that the main problem had been the lack of sufficient blooming and contending. Peng called on the "entire party" to carry out rectification in the spirit of Mao's line.

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Another CCP politburo member, Kang Sheng, spoke at this same propaganda conference. [redacted]

[redacted] As Kang's career had been spent almost entirely in party police work, he would be expected to be unsympathetic to the "hundred flowers" policy.

On 27 April the central committee of the CCP issued a directive on "rectification" of the party, a development which had been implied in speeches at the eighth congress and had been explicitly forecast since early March. ("Rectification" is a much larger subject than party policy toward intellectuals, and will be treated in a separate Polo paper.) The directive specified, inter alia, that party organs at all levels must review the execution of party policies, notably the "hundred flowers" policy. 25X1

Mao Tse-tung on 30 April made a [redacted] speech, in which he almost certainly gave new impetus to "blooming and contending." It seems likely, from the subsequent behavior of the regime's critics, that Mao in this speech guaranteed that critics would not be punished. He apparently condemned opponents of free criticism as being "tainted by the Kuomintang style"--a charge which appeared in a People's Daily editorial two days later. He seems to have gone even further--into the party's organizational methods--by suggesting that the party's committee system in universities might be jettisoned. It was later denied that Mao said this, but he must have said something like it; the question of party committees in schools became a very popular subject in May, and the Peiping press reported at the end of May that the committee system had already been abolished in one university in Shanghai.

The Intellectuals Attack the Party, May 1957

The end of April 1957 was the high point of Mao Tse-tung's personal encouragement of his "hundred flowers" policy. At that time, Mao's personal prestige was more strongly committed to the success of this policy than of any policy since mid-1955, when the speed-up in agricultural collectivization was personally ordered by Mao.

Moreover, several of Mao's top lieutenants had publicly associated themselves with the policy and had reassured the intellectuals who were to "bloom and contend." Chou En-lai had been wooing the intellectuals for more than a year, and reaffirmed his position early in May. Peng Chen had spoken emphatically in late April, and did so again in early May. Lu Ting-i had been explaining Mao's line for months.

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As of mid-April, almost all intellectuals, many of whom had suffered in the "three-anti's" and "five-anti's" campaigns of earlier years, were still suspicious of the new line. As a Marxist historian wrote in People's Daily on 20 April, the intellectuals were concerned as to whether "the loosening of the grip is genuine or false, a true goal or a trap." Most of them remained suspicious to the end, and declined to bloom and contend. However, in late April and early May, many intellectuals apparently concluded that the party was sincere.

They were almost certainly correct in believing that Mao's policy had not been designed as a trap. Mao's prestige would suffer too seriously--in view of his repeated assurances--when such a trap was sprung. There were some fatal flaws, however, in the thinking of those intellectuals who let themselves be cozened, during May, into speaking out boldly.

The most important was a failure to realize that Mao did not anticipate fundamental criticism of the entire Communist position, except perhaps from isolated individuals who could be easily dealt with. The evidence is strong that Mao believed that the intellectuals had been generally won over. Mao seems to have made the error, perhaps natural in his position of isolation from the daily life of China, of taking obedience for love.

Another mistake, on the part of those intellectuals who spoke out, was to think that those of Mao's lieutenants who had publicly endorsed his policy were as strongly in favor of it as he was. Some party leaders who publicly associated themselves with Mao's policy almost certainly did so out of opportunism, whereas others may have disapproved the policy but wished to help party members govern under the new and more difficult conditions imposed by Mao. In any case, the intellectuals could not reasonably have expected any of Mao's lieutenants to stand up firmly for them if Mao were to change his mind.

A third bad mistake was failure to recognize that certain key figures in the party leadership--notably Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping--had not associated themselves with the "hundred flowers." Liu had spoken of the policy without enthusiasm the previous September, and had said nothing for the record since. Teng had said nothing at any time. Both Liu and Teng made brief speeches in Peiping during May, and neither referred to the "hundred flowers." These were the persons--as the principal directors of the party apparatus--who would be expected to be the most concerned with Mao's tampering with the party's

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basic and time-tested methods of organizing, indoctrinating, and exploiting the Chinese people. By early May, Liu and Teng and their subordinates had plenty to worry about, with Mao encouraging the refractory human material of China to become even more refractory, and in effect advising the party cadres that their fitness reports were henceforth to be based in large part on their success in undermining their own positions.

During May, the Chinese Communist party held a series of forums in which non-Communists--mainly intellectuals--were encouraged to speak out. Li Wei-han, director of the party's united front department and a party leader regarded as close to Chou En-lai, called for "revelations of the mistakes of Communist party members...for the first time" in party history. It was not the unfortunate individual bureaucrat, but the entire Communist party, that was subsequently assailed.

The sharpest criticism--coming mainly from intellectuals belonging to the puppet parties--struck at the CCP's monopoly of power and its methods of asserting that monopoly. Deterioration of relations between the CCP and the people were said by the critics to be the natural consequence of the party's belief that it should control "everything under heaven." It was said that in China there was "only party, not government," and that in reality the party made all the decisions which under the law belonged to the government. It was further asserted that the CCP was not qualified to act as leader over the full range of its concern, and that non-Communists should be allowed to participate in the making of policy and in the review of "injustices" resulting from previous policies. It was proposed that CCP committees in educational institutions be abolished, that newspapers be allowed to print news, that scientists be free to act as scientists, and so on.

The party's basic policies were also hit hard. It was said that the tempo of socialization--fixed by Mao himself--should be slowed. It was argued that the party's domestic security measures, and the scope of its ideological "remolding" of the populace, had been excessive.

It was suggested that in Peiping's relationship with the USSR--based on Mao's own formulation of "leaning to one side"--the regime had leaned so far to one side that it had fallen flat: Peiping should be compensated for the Soviet looting of Manchuria in 1945-46, China should not have to bear the full cost of Chinese participation in the Korean war, China

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should get more favorable terms for Soviet aid. Moreover, the Soviet party's 20th congress had admitted that Soviet policies had been mistaken, and, judging from events in Poland and Hungary, mistakes were still being made. 25X1

There was apparently a low-level, poorly coordinated effort by the party--or by elements of the party--during May to keep criticism within bounds.

Mao Reverses "Liberalization," June 1957

An indication that the course of "liberalization" would be reversed was provided by Mao himself in an address to a Youth Corps congress on 25 May. It may be that increasing signs of disaffection and indiscipline among Chinese youth, from whom the party expected much more than from their elders long hardened in sin, precipitated Mao's decision. In any case, Mao told his audience flatly: "Words and actions which deviate from the cause of socialism are completely wrong."

It seems likely that the CCP leadership had closed ranks, on the decision to crack down, by the time of Mao's remarks to the Youth Corps. The circumstances of Mao's appearance there seemed designed to symbolize solidarity among the leaders. Mao was accompanied by all five of the other officers of the CCP central committee--Liu, Chou, Chu Te, Chen Yun, and Teng Hsiao-ping--and by Peng Chen, Lu Ting-i, and four other politburo members. The group included both those leaders who had been most active in promoting "liberalization"--Chou, Peng, and Lu--and those leaders who had been most conspicuously absent from that campaign, Liu and Teng.

The party press from 8 May to 7 June--the most lively period of blooming and contending--was operating under a central committee directive to refrain from serious counterattacks on "erroneous ideas," according to a later statement in People's Daily. On 8 June there began to appear in People's Daily some

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editorials providing further support for the belief that "liberalization" was receding. One editorial reported that a non-Communist government official had received an anonymous threatening letter after stating at one "forum" that criticism should not be one-sided and that the CCP had a right "to reply" to criticism; this official had been accused in the letter of "holding candles for the devil." The editorial noted ominously that "threats and insults" would only sharpen the party's awareness that class struggle continues.

The following day, an editorial stated that many erroneous views "detrimental to socialist undertakings" had appeared, and that correct counter criticism must be developed. A day later, an editorial cited the "reactionary, antisocialist views of an extremely small number of "rightists," identified as mainly students and professors.

People's Daily summed up the situation on 12 June. An editorial described the "overwhelming majority" of criticism thus far as "good, correct and beneficial," but noted that some of it had been "ill-disposed, hostile, and destructive." The newspaper stated that critics of the latter character must be counterattacked, in order that mass criticism might develop "healthfully."

The blow that blighted Mao's "hundred flowers" policy, as originally conceived, came from Mao himself. It came in the form of an official version, appearing on 18 June, of Mao's hitherto unpublished February speech on the handling of "contradictions." The June version admittedly contained certain of the author's "revisions and additions." These emendations were in effect an admission that Mao's policy had been a mistake and that the Kremlin had been right in its coolness toward the policy.

Mao in this official version reaffirmed his view that there are "contradictions" in a socialist society, including conflicts of interest between the "leadership and the led." He also reaffirmed his distinction between "antagonistic" contradictions, i.e., those "between ourselves and our enemies," and "nonantagonistic" contradictions, i.e., those "among the people." However, Mao specifically excluded from the ranks of the "people" all those who are "against the socialist revolution" and/or "try to wreck our socialist construction."

Mao in this version went to some length to defend the concept of a dictatorship exercised by the party in the name

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of the "people." He derided those who had been led by events in Hungary either (a) to hope for a similar uprising in China, or (b) to seek a two-party system of the Western type for China.

Mao went on to assert that, under the Communist order, "the people enjoy a wide measure of democracy and freedom, but at the same time they have to keep themselves within the bounds of socialist discipline." Within these confines, "in settling matters of an ideological nature" among the people, the party chooses to employ "democratic methods, methods of discussion, of criticism, of persuasion and education." In other words, as Liu Shao-chi made clear in 1942, the party leadership already has the truth, and, so long as this truth is not fundamentally challenged, will try by generally conciliatory means to bring everyone to the truth.

Later in this version of his speech, after discussing several of the regime's policies and problems, Mao turned to the intellectuals. Noting that "most" of them had "made marked progress" since 1950, Mao said that "we should trust intellectuals who are really willing to serve the cause of socialism." Reflecting the emphasis in Liu Shao-chi's remarks on the intellectuals in September 1956, Mao observed that a thorough change in the world-view of intellectuals "takes quite a long time." Mao criticized the decline in the ideological fitness of intellectuals and students, and called for a greater effort toward their "remolding."

A major section of Mao's speech was devoted to his "hundred flowers" policy. Mao defended the policy as designed to speed China's scientific and cultural development, and noted again that many "correct and good things"--including the Copernican theory, Darwin's theory of evolution, and Marxism itself--had originally been regarded not as flowers but as weeds. He reaffirmed that Marxism must develop through struggle, and that the "hundred flowers" policy would help Marxism to triumph in China. However, in contrast to Mao's reported view in February that concepts hostile to Marxism would no longer find a receptive audience in China, Mao in this official version called for suppression of "unmistakable counterrevolutionaries and wreckers" and for an attack on "poisonous weeds...wherever they crop up." Mao abjured the party to "distinguish carefully" between fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds.

At just that point in the official version, Mao added the criteria, for distinguishing flowers from weeds which

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killed the "hundred flowers." The addition of these criteria were, as a British observer remarked, as if Moses, in reviewing his works for publication, had casually inserted the Ten Commandments.

"Words and actions can be judged proper," Mao said, if they help to unite the nationalities in China, benefit "socialist transformation and construction," help to consolidate the dictatorship, help to strengthen "democratic centralism" (obedience to upper levels), tend to strengthen party leadership of the regime, and benefit "international socialist solidarity." The most important of these criteria, Mao added, related to the "socialist path and the leadership of the party." In sum, no one would be permitted henceforth to criticize the CCP's monopoly of power and its basic program--exactly those things which had been most enthusiastically criticized in the blooming and contending. (Mao added that "Those who do not approve of these criteria can still put forward their views and argue their case"--but it seems unlikely that even the most naive of the regime's opponents believed this, after Mao had spoken.) With respect to "supervision" of the Communist party by other parties, Mao remarked that "advice and criticism...will play a useful role...only when they conform to the six political criteria given above."

Although Mao's original miscalculation of the party's support among the intellectuals had become apparent before the official version of his February speech was released in June, and was evident beyond question in the "revisions and additions" appearing in the official version, the CCP's propaganda department strove manfully to conceal Mao's mistake. The department's tack was to attempt to create the impression that a carefully contrived trap had been laid, and that the intended prey had fallen into it.

The People's Daily asserted on 20 June that the party in its wisdom had planned to encourage "poisonous weeds to show themselves" so that they could later be uprooted. The same editorial gave away the show, however, by stating that the party's "rectification" campaign could proceed "smoothly" only when the attacks of the rightists had been smashed--in other words, that the antirightist part of the campaign had not been planned by the party but had been forced on it.

Similarly, People's Daily on 22 June argued that CCP members who had feared that Mao's policy would arouse "great disorder" in China, and that the people would "attack them," had been proven wrong. Actually, they had been proven right.

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In any case, apart from the wriggling of the propagandists to persuade the party and the populace that Mao had been right all along, the conclusion was clear to them both: "liberalization" was finished.

Solidarity of CCP Leaders, Summer 1957

Following the publication of the official version of Mao's speech on "contradictions," CCP leaders were at pains throughout summer 1957 to demonstrate their solidarity on the decision to reverse "liberalization" and to take a harder line toward the intellectuals. In particular, those of Mao's lieutenants who had had the most important roles in promoting "liberalization"--Chou En-lai, Lu Ting-i, and Peng Chen--found occasion during summer 1957 to make major speeches lining themselves up with Mao's revised position.

Chou En-lai was first in line, on 26 June. In contrast to the tendency of CCP pronouncements after September 1956 to minimize the class struggle, Chou called for recognition that a serious struggle continued. Reflecting Mao's criteria, Chou set high above criticism the concepts of "socialism...the basic system of our state,...the leading role of the Communist party," and...national and international unity." Further indicating the type of criticism which Mao and perhaps Chou had expected during "liberalization," and which was henceforth the only kind to be permitted, Chou conceded that there were defects in the working style of party and government functionaries. Chou called for a "determined struggle" against the "rightists" (fundamental critics), and warned that those who did not repent and "remold themselves" would "cut themselves off from the people."

On 1 July, the party began to attack individual rightists, rather than the general rightist position. People's Daily also admitted that there were "bourgeois rightists" in the CCP and its youth auxiliary as well as in the puppet parties whose ranks had provided most of the fundamental critics.

On 11 July, Lu Ting-i added his personal voice, rather than simply speaking through the propaganda department. Defending the original conception of the "hundred flowers" policy, Lu specified that up to 3 percent of university students and a "few percent" of intellectuals had proved themselves to be corrupted. Reaffirming the new emphasis on a continuing class struggle, Lu called for a long process of "remolding."

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An interesting sidelight on the question of disagreement among CCP leaders over the "liberalization" policy came on 16 July, in a forum of scientists in Peiping. According to Peiping itself, one delegate asserted that "liberalization" had developed poorly because high-ranking CCP members--for example, Liu Shao-chi and Peng Chen--had opposed it and had attempted to sabotage it. This delegate further asserted that Mao had been forced to compromise, and to agree to the counterattack, by these other leaders. Peiping denied these charges. The delegate was probably mistaken in part--insofar as he implied that there was still a high-level split in the party after the critics had attacked the CCP's entire position. The delegate was very probably right in part, however, as disagreement had apparently persisted well into May, Liu Shao-chi had probably been unsympathetic to the "hundred flowers" (and Peng Chen may have been, despite his role in promoting the policy), and Mao may well have been offered serious counsel by Liu and others from the early stages of blooming and contending.

People's Daily on 28 July, possibly reflecting the recent activity of party guardians such as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, stated that the "antirightist struggle...has exposed many rightists" within the Chinese Communist party, and had revealed considerable receptivity in the party to "bourgeois ideas." This admission did not suggest the presence, at the top levels of the party, of a "rightist" clique sympathetic to the fundamental critics. Among the leadership, as distinct from the party mass, the evidence indicated only a "leftist" or orthodox opposition to Mao's earlier line. It was the orthodox position which, in late May or early June, had triumphed.

Peng Chen on 4 August became the last of the three principal exponents of Mao's earlier line on "liberalization" to stand up for the new line. Peng, the most emphatic of Mao's lieutenants in espousing the old line, was among the most emphatic in endorsing the new one. The party, Peng declared, cannot tolerate rightist attacks, and the rightists must recognize that it is a choice between "absolute right and absolute wrong." Like other party leaders, Peng said that the party would continue to welcome criticism of the "work and working style" of party and government functionaries.

Lu Ting-i spoke up again on 16 August. Lu described the antirightist campaign as a "life-and-death" struggle. He reaffirmed the orthodox objective of "an intelligentsia of the working class," which was to include only those intellectuals the old society who had "truly transformed" themselves and could be relied on to oppose every manifestation of bourgeois thought.

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Perhaps the most amusing illustration of the new line came in a People's Daily editorial of 16 August. The editorial observed that the development of the anti-rightist campaign had been uneven, in large part because of "differences in the seriousness of the leadership" of various organs in various areas. Some of the "principal responsible cadres" had failed to assume a "serious, responsible attitude...." In other words, whereas party cadres had previously been told that their prospects for advancement would depend on their success in stimulating criticism, they were now being told that their prospects would depend on their alacrity in apprehending and punishing the critics.

Many other party leaders took some part, during summer 1957, in the explication of Mao's new position. The summer was a period of "Great Debate"--that is, reaffirmation of principles which were not henceforth to be questioned, in the guise of finding overwhelming popular support of those principles.

Of the other members of the politburo--i.e., in addition to Mao, Chou, Lu Ting-i and Peng Chen--Kang Sheng made a fairly important address in support of ideological orthodoxy. Kang, whose speech in April during the period of blooming and contending had not been published, was evidently on more congenial ground on this occasion. Lesser statements, on one or another feature of the new line, were delivered by Chu Te, Tung Pi-wu, Peng Te-huai, Chen Po-ta, and Po I-po.

Below the politburo level, the most ambitious speech on the "antirightist struggle" was given by Ko Ching-shih, head of the Shanghai regional bureau and the Shanghai municipal committee of the party. Ko, who has seemed close to the conjectured "organizational" group of party leaders led by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, and who in 1958 has seemed to be a personal friend of Mao's as well, gave a long report in Shanghai in mid-August. Ko's report was the sort of exegesis of Mao's line ordinarily expected only from a member of the inner circle, and anticipated certain features of Teng Hsiao-ping's definitive report on "rectification" given in September. Other important members of the central committee getting into the act during the summer were An Tzu-wen, Li Ko-nung, Li Hsueh-feng, Li Wei-han, Teng Ying-chao, and Lai Jo-yu, directors of important central departments of the party.

Important members of the politburo missing from the "anti-rightist struggle" of summer 1957 were Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Chen Yun, Chen I, Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien, Ulanfu, and Chang Wen-tien. Also missing was Teng Tzu-hui, director of the

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party's rural work department. None of these persons is known to have taken a strong position, prior to the crack-down, which had to be publicly reversed, but they were probably missing for different reasons. As for the first three persons named above, each of them an officer of the central committee, it seems likely that Liu and Teng had been unsympathetic to "liberalization" and thus saw no need to hurry to go on record after they had been proved right; whereas Chen Yun's absence seemed to be related to a general decline in his activity.

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The two Li's, as economists, were not as directly concerned with "liberalization" as party ideologists and organizers. Ulanfu was important primarily as party boss in Mongolia, where "liberalization" was apparently not much of an issue. The absence of Chang Wen-tien and Teng Tzu-hui seemed likely to be the result of a decline in their importance in party councils.

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Teng Hsiao-ping Sums It Up, September 1957

The People's Daily announced on 5 September that the CCP's "rectification" movement, under way since May, and the party-directed "antirightist campaign," under way since June, would be merged to become "a rectification movement of all the people." On 23 September, Teng Hsiao-ping, the party's secretary general, speaking before a plenary session of the central committee, gave a long report on the new "nationwide rectification movement." In laying out guide lines for the movement, Teng made clear the party's decision to return to a hard orthodox policy toward the intellectuals.

Teng in his report gave Mao Tse-tung credit for having decided, in July, to merge the two campaigns into one movement, and for having set forth the "clear-cut principles" for its development which Teng's report was to explicate. Orthodox party leaders' view of Mao's earlier role was perhaps involuntarily illuminated in Teng's statement that developments "during the past four months," i.e., since late May, the time when Mao apparently decided to reverse "liberalization," had been "fully compatible with the analysis of the central committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung...." In other words, Mao's assessment prior to late May had been mistaken.

Teng called for a continuation of the "great national debate" on such fundamental questions as whether the party's achievements or its mistakes were more important; whether the goal of "socialism" was correct; whether "Communist party

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leadership, proletarian dictatorship, and the system of democratic centralism" were desirable; and whether Peiping's foreign policies were correct. Teng was thus calling, like Mao in June and others since, for intensive indoctrination of the populace and the party masses in orthodox Communist dogmas which were not henceforth to be questioned.

Teng devoted one major section of his report specifically to the "bourgeoisie and the intellectuals." Mao's discussion of this subject in the official version of his speech could be seen by careful examination to be hard in substance, but Mao's manner had been kindly. Teng took care to be harsh enough in both substance and manner to prevent any misunderstanding.

Noting that the 'antirightist struggle' had been conducted mainly among the bourgeoisie and (their) intellectuals, Teng specified that "the bourgeoisie, especially their intellectuals, now constitute the main force that can challenge the proletariat"--in other words, the source of the most dangerous opposition to the party. Unless they "transform themselves... to serve socialism," Teng warned, they will become suspended in mid-air.

Teng said that blooming and contending would continue in academic and cultural fields, but "socialism is the premise" for all such discussion. Specifically, there would be no change in the principles of "party leadership, the proletarian dictatorship, and the system of democratic centralism." Similarly, the "primary policies of the party, such as...elimination of counterrevolutionaries, collectivization, and state purchasing and marketing of major farm products...will not undergo any change." Teng noted that the sole purpose of encouraging "poisonous weeds"--the expression of opinion hostile to the party's principles and policies--was "to use them as fertilizer." He added that those who do not accept these principles and policies would find themselves in the position of enemies of the people.

Teng went on to describe the intellectuals in terms of three groups: the "leftists" who support socialism and the CCP, the "rightists" who oppose them, and a group larger than the other two together, the "middle-of-the-roaders." Teng added that the rightist attacks had proved that the majority of intellectuals were "still unwilling" to accept Communist leadership. (This was a harsher and more realistic assessment than Chou En-lai's in 1956 and Mao Tse-tung's in 1956 and early 1957, when a belief that the majority of intellectuals

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were supporters of the party and its program clearly underlay the experiment in "liberalization.") Teng observed that the antirightist campaign had begun to induce some change in the thinking of this majority, and called for the campaign to continue "to the end."

Returning to Mao Tse-tung's line of 1942, which had been reaffirmed by spokesmen for orthodoxy at various times thereafter, Teng stated that the ideological reform of intellectuals is a "long-term task," requiring perhaps ten years or more. In addition to providing the intellectuals with intensive "socialist education," Teng said, the party must take vigorous organizational measures to ensure its control over the intellectuals.

Teng went on to state that the party must produce its own intellectuals: "professors, teachers, scientists, journalists, writers, artists, and Marxist theoreticians." All central and local organs of the party, Teng said, must draw up concrete plans to this end. As a part of this effort, the party would "absorb in a planned manner revolutionary intellectuals of fine character." This was consistent with the conservative approach to the recruiting of intellectuals taken by Liu Shao-chi and Teng himself at the CCP congress in September 1956, in contrast to the confidence displayed by Chou En-lai earlier in 1956 in his call for the recruitment of one third of all high-level intellectuals by 1962. However, Teng did call, as had Chou in 1956, for better treatment of intellectuals submissive to the party.

Teng also had a few words to say about members of the CCP classified as intellectuals. In comparison with June 1956, by September 1957 (Teng's figures, in both cases) the number of party members classified as intellectuals had risen by more than 600,000 to a total of 1,880,000, and, in terms of percentage, had risen from about 12 to about 15 percent. Teng observed sourly that "during a certain period"--presumably since mid-1956 and presumably as a result of the Mao-Chou confidence in the intellectuals--the party had "absorbed too many young intellectuals who had not undergone productive labor, steeling, and actual struggle...." Teng said that intellectuals accepted in the future would be only those "steeled in production and struggle," and that those who had not had that experience would be sent down to lower levels to get it.

By the time Teng's speech was published, in October 1957, there was plenty of evidence that the party meant what Teng said. Hundreds of "rightists" had been "exposed" and professionally ruined, and the total bag was obviously to be thousands.

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Many "rightists" who had slipped into the category of "counterrevolutionaries" had been arrested, and some had reportedly been shot.

It must have been clear to the intellectuals that their position in October 1957 was, and would remain, considerably worse than it had been in early 1956, when Mao and Chou began the experiment with "liberalization." Not only had the party been confirmed in an orthodox distrust of them but that distrust had increased, and the party now had a substantial record of their feelings with which to keep distrust alive and to discourage any future temptation to "liberalize." Not only would the intellectuals be unable to modify Communist dogmas and institutions, but they would be forced to suffer longer indoctrination and more severe repression. Not only would it be difficult for them to find work they could respect in a field of their choosing, but very few of them--even among those who were taken into the party--could look forward to anything more than ill-paid drudgery for life. The hope of a decent accommodation with the Communists was extinguished.

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The status of several Chinese Communist party leaders may have been affected by developments related to party policies toward the intellectuals in the past few years. Those most likely to have been affected, at the politburo level, would appear to be Mao Tse-tung himself, Chou En-lai, Lu Ting-i, and Peng Chen, the principal spokesman for the soft phase of Mao's thinking, and Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, the conjectured defenders of orthodoxy.

Mao Tse-tung, despite his orthodox background of distrust of intellectuals, was almost certainly primarily responsible for the experiment with "liberalization" in 1956-57. In January 1956, acting with Chou En-lai, Mao proposed better treatment of tame intellectuals. In May 1956, Mao personally inaugurated "liberalization" with his "hundred flowers" slogan. In February and March of 1957, Mao strongly reaffirmed his soft policy

In April 1957, Mao again spoke strongly for his policy, and apparently suggested an inclination to alter the party's orthodox organizational as well as ideological procedures. Only after his policy had clearly failed--i.e., in late May 1957--did Mao reaffirm an orthodox position. Following Mao's reaffirmation, the party was in an even worse position, with respect to enlisting the intellectuals, than it had been before Mao stirred them up.

In sum, Mao in May was exposed to the party as foolish (on this issue), and Mao in June was exposed to the intellectuals (in China and wherever the campaign had been followed) as treacherous. The latter is probably of little importance, with regard to Mao's status in the party, but Mao's miscalculation and his persistence in a wrong-headed policy would seem of some importance. Moreover, his failure in this instance was not unique, but followed at least two other instances of personal intervention which also had less gratifying results than Mao had promised. One of these was his insistence in late 1955 that "rightist conservatism" in economic planning must be overcome, with the result that planning for 1956 was excessively ambitious and led to dislocations in the economy that took about a year to correct. Another was his encouragement of Gomulka in conversations and by other actions in the fall of 1956, which had the effect of emboldening "revisionist" thinking throughout Eastern Europe and in China itself. All three of these mistakes derived from Mao's over-confidence in his assessments.

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Mao's position in the party was so strong that he could survive--perhaps only he could survive--three consecutive mistakes of this magnitude. It seems fair to conclude, however, that by mid-1957 Mao's stature had somewhat diminished, in the eyes of some if not most of his lieutenants. It seems likely that Mao had brought the time nearer when one of his personal policies would be actively opposed by a bloc of his own lieutenants, and the time nearer also when he would be encouraged to step aside by becoming the party's "Honorary Chairman."

Chou En-lai, with a background of less hostility to intellectuals than most party leaders, and with a government job which gave him a strong interest in getting more use out of intellectuals, probably approved the "soft" line which he introduced in January 1956. His personal views were probably again reflected in his conciliatory remarks at the party congress in September 1956. It is very doubtful that Chou suffered any decline in status, in Mao's eyes, for having supported Mao's line on "liberalization." Moreover, Mao's personal identification with the policy was so marked that he could not have made Chou the scapegoat for the failure of the policy, in the eyes of other party leaders, even if he had wanted to. It is possible that the defenders of orthodoxy did not blame Chou appreciably for his association with the policy. It seems more likely, however, that Chou lost at least a little face with this group, because, after all, they had managed to avoid identification with the policy, and Chou, whatever his reasons, had not.

Lu Ting-i, with a background as a spokesman for Mao which left uncertain his own attitude toward the intellectuals, was a spokesman for all phases of Mao's thinking. Lu's propaganda department administered the policy of attacks on the intellectuals in 1954-55, and then supported Chou's soft line in early 1956. Lu personally explicated Mao's line on "liberalization" in the spring of 1956. The propaganda department took a more conservative line after the troubles in Eastern Europe in the fall of 1956, and then got in step with Mao's reaffirmation of his liberal position in the spring of 1957. Lu announced the imminent "rectification" campaign in the party in April 1957, and finally lined up with Mao in the reversal of "liberalization" in summer 1957. In sum, Lu was so well known to other party leaders as simply a reflector of Mao's position that his personal situation could have remained unchanged. However, he may also have lost some face with the "organizational" group. Lui's position in the party has seemed to depend so heavily on Mao that, in terms of Lu's future, Lu's personal line on any given issue in recent years may not much matter.

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That is, the party leadership which succeeds Mao may get another propaganda chief in any case.

Peng Chen's intentions, in playing his role in the encouragement and then reversal of "liberalization," are very hard to assess. Peng has been regarded as a protégé of both Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, and has been thought to belong in the conjectured "organizational" group of party leaders centered on Liu and Teng Hsiao-ping. However, it has been thought possible that Peng is less than a whole-hearted comrade of either Liu or Teng, because Teng replaced Peng from about 1953 as Liu's first lieutenant for party affairs. On the basis of his pre-1957 record, Peng's strong support of the reversal of "liberalization" in summer 1957 was the line which Peng would have been expected to approve, rather than the line strongly in favor of "liberalization" which Peng had taken in April 1957. If Peng's hard line of August was known by other party leaders to represent his true attitude, it seems likely that Peng, like Chou En-lai, would have lost only a little face with the "organizational" comrades for having been induced to play a role during the soft phase of Mao's thinking. However, it is conceivable that Peng, in associating himself so strongly with Mao's policy in spring 1957, was making a deliberate bid for Mao's favor over Liu and Teng, with the hope of eventually displacing them both. If this is true, and on the assumption that it would have been apparent to Liu and Teng if it were true, Peng injured himself sorely and perhaps irreparably with the latter pair.

Liu Shao-chi, with a background of distrust of intellectuals at least as strong as Mao's pre-1956 attitude, is surmised to have been throughout the leader of forces unsympathetic to "liberalization." Liu did not go on record to support Chou's soft line of early 1956, and, while he formally endorsed the "hundred flowers" concept in September 1956, his emphasis was definitely on the unreliability of the intellectuals and their potential for corruption. Liu's speech of April 1957, following Mao's reaffirmation of a liberal position, was not published, and, particularly in the light of the increasing threat to orthodox ideological and organizational procedures, seems likely to have had the same disagreeable emphasis as his remarks of the previous September. When Liu's presumed position was vindicated in the spring of 1957, Liu remained silent, as he could certainly afford to do if his position were already well known to other party leaders. In sum, it seems likely that Liu was both right on this issue and tactful about being right. He apparently retained his status as Mao's favorite lieutenant and presumably gained prestige

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with other party leaders, and thus enhanced his prospects to dominate the group which dominates the party after Mao's death or retirement.

Teng Hsiao-ping, with a background of attitudes similar to Liu's and a recent history of close association with Liu, first took a hand in stating party policy toward intellectuals in September 1956. At that time, he avoided endorsing the "hundred flowers" policy and took a line on the intellectuals similar to Liu's although less pronounced than Liu's. Teng did not associate himself with "liberalization" in any way in the following year, and may reasonably be conjectured to have shared Liu's view of the entire affair. At the same time, Teng apparently retained Mao's good opinion, as he was chosen to lay out the guide lines for the nationwide "rectification" in September 1957. In so doing, Teng reaffirmed an orthodox hard policy toward intellectuals believed to be entirely in agreement with Liu's position. Teng seemed to come out of it at least as well as Liu. He apparently stood with Liu and thus enhanced his prospects to be a key figure in the succession, and he may even have improved his chances for displacing Liu if that temptation should arise.

Ko Ching-shih, the party boss of East China, also seemed to come out very well. Regarded as a member of the "organizational" group around Liu and Teng, Ko played a major role only after the reversal of "liberalization." By playing this role in summer 1957 along the lines of both Mao's official position of June 1957 and Teng's position as later stated in September 1957, Ko probably gained favor with both Mao and the "organizational" figures, and improved his chances to be taken into the inner circle.

Kang Sheng, with a background of party police work and a presumed aversion to intellectuals, played no public role in encouraging "liberalization" and played a fairly important role in reaffirming orthodoxy after "liberalization" was reversed. In appearing to stand with Liu and Teng, Kang may have improved his position, which had not seemed strong since his demotion from full to alternate member of the politburo in 1956.

At the time of this writing (May 1958), it cannot be demonstrated that the particular issue of the intellectuals has affected the status of individual leaders--not, that is, to the same degree that the particular issue of the speed of agricultural collectivization can be shown to have affected

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the status of Teng Tzu-hui. Teng at the party congress in September 1956 stated publicly that he had taken a mistakenly conservative position on this question; the congress failed to elect him to the politburo and indeed dropped him 12 slots on the central committee, and he was subsequently displaced by Tan Chen-lin (an "organizational" type) as the party's main spokesman on agriculture. Similar admissions of error, or assertions of virtue, may never appear, with regard to policy toward intellectuals, as Mao himself was most at fault. It may be that the issue can only be presumed--never demonstrated--to be a contributing factor in the rise or decline of the figures discussed in this paper.

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